In Collins, Sam v. Federal Express Corporation, 2025 WL 1764809 (2d Cir. June 26, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, inter alia, affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims as being time-barred.
From the decision:
We also agree that Collins’ hostile-work-environment claims are time-barred. A hostile work environment exists where “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (Title VII); see also Davis-Garett v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 921 F.3d 30, 41 (2d Cir. 2019) (same, for the ADEA); Brittell v. Department of Correction, 247 Conn. 148, 166–67 (1998) (same, for the CFEPA). Title VII, the ADEA, and the CFEPA each require a prospective plaintiff to initiate charges within 300 days after the alleged hostile environment “occurred.” Banks v. General Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242, 259 (2d Cir. 2023) (Title VII); see In re IBM Arbitration Agreement Litig., 76 F.4th 74, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2023) (ADEA); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-82(f)(1)(B).3 Because Collins filed his CHRO charge on October 16, 2020, any conduct occurring before December 19, 2019, is not actionable under the ordinary 300-day rule.
We reject Collins’ argument that the otherwise time-barred course of harassment in 2011 and 2017 is actionable under the continuing violation doctrine. “Because a constellation of events over time can collectively give rise to a hostile environment claim, if an act contributing to the hostile environment occurs within the filing period, the hostile work environment claim is timely,” and a defendant may be liable “for the entire time period of the hostile environment, including the period falling outside the limitations period.” King v. Aramark Services Inc., 96 F.4th 546, 560 (2d Cir. 2024). But here, the only adverse act within the limitations period was Collins’ termination, and that act—undertaken by his supervisors in response to a complaint of workplace misconduct by Collins—was not part of the course of alleged harassment by the mechanic. Cf. King, 96 F.4th at 562 (holding that the plaintiff’s termination might be part of continuing sexual harassment violation where harasser played an instrumental role in termination).
The court also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s aiding and abetting, disparate treatment, and retaliation claims.