In Kennedy v. Ceva Logistics U.S., Ing., No. 3:23-cv-01362, 2025 WL 2231049 (M.D.Tenn. Aug. 5, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim of race-based hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
As to the element of “severity”, the court explained:
CEVA attempts to show that Ms. Kennedy lacks evidence of a severely or pervasively racially hostile work environment by directing the Court to her deposition testimony that she complained to it and WPS that Mr. Reyes “sexually harassed her” and that he used “a racial epithet … in the course of his inappropriate behavior.” (Doc. No. 23 at 1-2 (referencing Mr. Reyes’ statement to Ms. Kennedy: “you go to Chicago to suck your [n-word]’s dick.”)).
Whether harassing conduct is severe or pervasive is “quintessentially a question of fact.” Schlosser v. VRHabilis, LLC, 113 F.4th 674, 687 (6th Cir. 2024). Courts “must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the harassment was sufficiently severe and pervasive.” Strickland v. City of Detroit, 995 F.3d 495, 506 (6th Cir. 2021) (“The harassing conduct cannot be viewed in isolation.”). Factors relevant to this analysis include “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). Courts may also consider conduct and/or comments which disparage or single out members of a protected class of which the plaintiff is a member, even if the conduct and/or comments were directed at someone other than the plaintiff, because such evidence is relevant to whether a work environment was objectively hostile. See Strickland, 995 F.3d at 506; Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 660-61 (6th Cir. 1999). Facially neutral incidents may be considered in the hostile work environment analysis when there is some circumstantial or other basis for inferring that incidents neutral on their face were in fact discriminatory. See Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2013).
According to CEVA, Ms. Kennedy’s racially hostile work environment claim is premised entirely on evidence of a “single racial epithet,” which “does not meet the standard for severe or pervasive harassment” as a matter of law. (See Doc. No. 23 at 12 (citing Hibbler v. Reg’l Med. Ctr. at Memphis, 12 F. App’x 336, 338-39 (6th Cir. 2001) (one incident of racial harassment (not involving the n-word) over the course of almost eight years of employment was not severe or pervasive enough to support a racially hostile work environment claim). CEVA’s argument fails as a matter of law and fact. First, CEVA ignores the undisputed evidence that Mr. Reyes repeatedly told Ms. Kennedy he would “buy” her daughter – as if she were a slave to be bought. (Pl. SOF ¶¶ 22, 116). Second, CEVA fails to acknowledge the evidence that it ignored Ms. Kennedy’s report of racially harassing conduct and found Mr. Reyes sexually harassed white female employees but not Ms. Kennedy. (See Pl. SOF ¶¶ 73, 121-124). Third, case law does not support the proposition that a single use of the n-word is never sufficiently severe racially harassing conduct. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (an “extremely serious” isolated incident could be sufficiently severe for purposes of hostile work environment claim); Bennett v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tennessee, 977 F.3d 530, 543 n.7 (6th Cir. 2020) (the n-word “is perhaps the most offensive and inflammatory racial slur in English, … a word expressive of racial hatred and bigotry” and “the centuries of history that make the use of the term more than just a single word.”)
As to employer liability, the court noted that the record contained evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the response was neither prompt nor appropriate. Specifically, the court cited “conflicting evidence as to whether [defendant] had notice of Mr. Reyes’ racially and/or sexually harassing conduct.”