In Delgado v. Donald Trump for President, Inc., Sean Spicer, Reince Priebus, Stephen Bannon, 19 Civ. 11764 (AT), 2025 WL 2636259 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s pregnancy discrimination claims asserted under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).
As to the NYSHRL, the court explained:
Defendants argue that summary judgment is warranted because Delgado cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and even if she could, Defendants have demonstrated that they had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for any adverse actions taken against her, and these reasons were not pretextual.7 Def. Mem. at 8–14. They are wrong.
First, as a pregnant woman, Delgado was a member of a protected class. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a).
Second, the record supports that she was qualified for a job with the Campaign, the Transition, and the White House. See, e.g., Pl. Ex. 32 at DEF-486, 494–95, 576, 1978 (November 2016 emails from high-level Campaign and Transition leaders praising Delgado’s work).
Third, Delgado suffered adverse employment actions. Beyond her testimony that she was ostracized and constructively terminated from her role on the Campaign and Transition, she has also adduced evidence that her name was removed from a list of Campaign and Transition employees destined for roles in the White House. See Def. Ex. 1 at 263:22–268:23 (Delgado’s testimony that, after her pregnancy became public, she stopped receiving communications from the Campaign and Transition and was excluded from opportunities to make media appearances). Compare Pl. Ex. 60 at DEF-299–302 (December 21, 2016 email from Spicer with a proposed list of White House press employees that includes Delgado as “Director of Hispanic Media”), with id. at TFA-DG-7514–15 (January 11, 2017 email from Spicer with a proposed list that does not include Delgado).
Fourth, Delgado proffers evidence suggesting that Defendants acted with a discriminatory motive. She details how, mere days after she told Spicer, Priebus, and other Campaign and Transition workers that she was pregnant, she stopped being included on certain communications, received fewer opportunities for media appearances, and was taken off a list of potential White House employees. See Pl. Mem. at 18–19, ECF No. 501; Def. Ex. 1 at 264:11–266:5; Pl. Ex. 60 at DEF-691–92, DEF-2315–19, DEF-2394 (December 6, 21, and 27, 2016 draft White House organization charts listing Delgado as “Director of Hispanic Media”); id. at TFA-DG-7514–15 (January 11, 2017 White House staff list omitting Delgado). She also recalls a conversation in which Spicer told her that “the White House is no place for a new mom” and that he would not be able to work there but for the fact that he relies on his wife and others to care for his children. Def. Ex. 1 at 239:19–241:23. The timing of these adverse actions combined with Spicer’s alleged comments suffice to establish prima facie discrimination. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that “[c]ircumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include … invidious comments about others in the employee’s protected group, … or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group … or the timing of the [plaintiff’s] discharge” (citations omitted)).
Defendants contend that they had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Delgado’s employment. See Def. Mem. at 9–14. They point out that the Consulting Agreement specified that her work for the Campaign would continue only through November 10, 2016, right after the presidential election, and they claim that, after that date, “[t]here simply was no job available for Plaintiff with the Campaign.” Id. at 9–10; see Def. Ex. 10 at P-451. But Delgado continued working after November 10, as evidenced by email records and deposition testimony showing that she worked on behalf of President-elect Trump through at least the end of December 2016. See, e.g., Def. Ex. 1 at 152:18–155:21; Pl. Ex. 51 at P-437 (discussing “campaign salary-payments” for Delgado’s work in December 2016 and January 2017). It was only after Spicer, Priebus, and other Campaign and Transition staff learned of her pregnancy that Delgado’s work dried up, raising a question of fact as to the ultimate reason for her termination. See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37. Likewise, Defendants’ claims that after she announced her pregnancy, Delgado was not denied the opportunity to make television appearances, and that Delgado made the decision not to make such appearances, conflict with other evidence in the record. See Def. Mem. at 9–10; Def. Ex. 1 at 263:22–268:23 (Delgado testifying that work was taken away from her against her wishes). Moreover, Defendants’ argument that they cannot be held responsible for gender-based discrimination because Delgado did not face such discrimination when she first started working for the Campaign, see Def. Mem. at 10–11, is barely worth addressing; a plaintiff need not have faced discrimination for the entirety of her time with an employer for her to make out a viable claim. See LaGrassa v. Autoone Ins. Co., No. 07 Civ. 1072, 2008 WL 3887606, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2008).
The Court also rejects Defendants’ argument that Delgado’s claims fail because she “cannot demonstrate that the Campaign treated any similarly-situated employees more favorably than it did [Delgado].” Def. Mem. at 11. A plaintiff can succeed on a discrimination claim without identifying the existence of similarly situated employees who were treated more favorably. See Chambers, 43 F.3d 29 (describing such evidence as only one of many circumstances that may “contribut[e] to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent”); Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir. 2001); Minto v. Molloy Univ., 715 F. Supp. 3d 422, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2024). Delgado has adduced sufficient evidence to support a finding of pretext and discriminatory intent, including but not limited to the “sequence of events” leading to Delgado’s termination, Spicer and Priebus’ apparent involvement in that termination, and “degrading” comments about the capacity of pregnant women. Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37.
(Cleaned up; paragraphing added.)
Having reached this conclusion as to plaintiff’s claim under the NYSHRL, the court reached the same conclusion on plaintiff’s NYCHRL claim, given the NYCHRL’s “more relaxed standards for liability.”