In Al-Rahman v. American Sugar Refining, Inc. et al, No. 23-CV-06589 (LAP), 2026 WL 848518 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2026), the court considered whether and to what extent a settlement agreement (here, resolving employment discrimination claims) affects future claims.
In sum, plaintiff alleged at the EEOC and in a lawsuit that defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination and hostile work environment based upon his race and color, and in retaliation for his complaints. The parties resolved this action by a confidential Settlement Agreement and Release, which included a broad, general release of claims. Plaintiff alleges that following Plaintiff’s acceptance of this Settlement Agreement and dismissal of the lawsuit, defendant’s “retaliatory campaign against Plaintiff continued and intensified.”
After determining that the settlement agreement is valid and enforceable, the court continued:
While Plaintiff cannot bring claims based on alleged acts occurring prior to the execution of the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff argues that he is, at a minimum, permitted to reference evidence related to the released claims as background to support a showing of discriminatory intent and motive in a new action based on conduct occurring after October 30, 2020. (Pl. Opp. at 23.)
Courts are split as to whether a Plaintiff may rely upon pre-release alleged acts as background to support a post-release claim. See Shub v. Westchester Community College, 556 F. Supp. 2d 227, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that despite a general release barring Plaintiff from bringing claims against Defendants based on actions prior to the signing of the release, Plaintiff did not release Defendants from liability for actions taken after the execution of the release, and may rely on events occurring before the execution to establish “background for defendants’ retaliatory intentions and conduct.”); but see Crenshaw v. New York City Hous. Auth., 697 F. App’x 726, 730 n.4 (2d Cir. 2017) (“In light of the stipulation that Rivers signed in settlement of the 2009 Petition, we do not consider the events predating the release in our analysis.”); Bernardi v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 2023 WL 3230558, at *7 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2023) (“[b]ecause the February 2015 settlement included a release of all claims relating to employment discrimination, plaintiff cannot rely on pre-February 2015 incidents in his current complaint.”); Noel v. Inc. Vill. of Lake Success, 2016 WL 740436, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2016) (“the Court has determined that it will not consider testimony offered by the Plaintiff as to background evidence which pre-dates the June 3, 2010 execution of the Settlement Agreement.”); Awolesi v. Shinseki, 2012 WL 527631, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2012) (“because the Court finds that Plaintiff knowingly and willfully entered into the settlement agreement, the Court will not consider the conduct that occurred between 2005 and 2007 as background evidence for Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination and retaliation.”).
The Court agrees with the Defendants position—which is consistent with the majority of case law in this jurisdiction—that the pre-release alleged facts should not be considered as background in support of post-release claims.
First, if Plaintiff were permitted to present years of evidence predating the execution of the Settlement Agreement, it would undermine the very purpose of the Agreement and deprive the parties of the benefit of their bargain. It would also allow Plaintiff to receive a windfall—retaining the settlement payment while nevertheless bringing claims based, at least in part, on pre-agreement conduct. Pitre v. City of N.Y., 713 F. Supp. 3d 13, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (“[p]ermitting a plaintiff to rely on pre-release acts to support a new claim of discrimination or retaliation would undermine the very purpose of a release.”).
Second, the pre-release evidence is not necessary to support the new claims. Plaintiff alleges that, after October 30, 2020, Defendants engaged in a “deliberate discriminatory effort” to “set Plaintiff up for failure” by refusing to provide onboarding or shadowing for his new position and by unreasonably reassigning numerous responsibilities to Plaintiff. (Pl. Opp. at 2-18.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants denied him paternity leave, refused to grant a bonus or salary increase, and ultimately terminated his employment in retaliation and based on discriminatory animus, offering pretextual explanations while the true motivation was his race and religion. (Id.) These are standalone allegations, each potentially sufficient to support a claim for employment discrimination or retaliation, and the twenty-five pages of allegations in the complaint referring to conduct prior to the execution of the Settlement Agreement are therefore unnecessary as background.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the settlement agreement barred plaintiff from “bringing any and all” claims against defendants based on, or in reliance upon, acts occurring before the settlement agreement was executed, and therefore that defendants were entitled to summary judgment.