In Knight v. MTA – New York City Transit, No. 19-CV-1428 (PKC) (SDE), 2026 WL 875339 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026), the court granted plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s summary judgment order on plaintiff’s claims of discrimination and retaliation under the New York City Human Rights Law, and discrimination and retaliation claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (as recently amended).
From the decision:
As to discrimination, there are at least two pieces of evidence that the Court finds support Plaintiff’s claim that she was treated less well because of her race or gender. First, Plaintiff claims that she and all of the other Black analysts in her group were assigned to work for the same supervisor between mid-2014 and November 2019, and that supervisor was also Black. (See Summ. J. Order, Dkt. 116, at 7.) The Court acknowledged that “assigning all Black employees to a Black supervisor could give rise to an inference of discrimination,” (id. at 40), and while that inference is too attenuated under the Title VII and pre-amendment NYSHRL standards given other circumstances here, (see id.), it is sufficient under the NYCHRL and post-amendment NYSHRL standard.9 Second, Plaintiff claims that Jai Balkaran, who was Plaintiff’s supervisor from November 2019 through 2021, made a comment to her around October 2020 “about a ‘Tyler Perry movie about an angry [B]lack woman,’ ” which Plaintiff “decoded” as a reference to herself. (Id. at 21 (quoting Knight Dep. Tr., Dkt. 109-61, at 220:17–221:8).) As to retaliation, there is also evidence that supports Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant’s conduct was motivated by retaliatory animus. Specifically, during the same October 2020 conversation, Balkaran asked Plaintiff, “If you had [to do it] over, would you still sue transit?” (Id. (quoting Knight Dep. Tr., Dkt. 109-61, at 216:14–21).) Based on this evidence, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that discrimination or retaliation played no role in Defendant’s actions, and summary judgment was therefore unwarranted. See Ya-Chen Chen, 805 F.3d at 76.
Plaintiff has also put forth sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute of material fact over whether Defendant treated her “less well” (as required for her discrimination claims) or engaged in conduct that is reasonably likely to deter employees from opposing discrimination (as required for her retaliation claims). (See Summ. J. Order, Dkt. 116, at 21 (Balkaran’s statements to Plaintiff in October 2020, as described above); id. at 38 (being denied overtime opportunities); id. at 39 (not being paid for overtime worked in 2017 and December 2019); id. at 42, 44 (being marked AWOL while out sick in 2018, 2019, and 2021); id. at 42 (being subject to OATH10 disciplinary charges).) Finally, it is undisputed that Plaintiff took actions opposing what she perceived as her employer’s discrimination (as required for her retaliation claims), including by filing this lawsuit in March 2019 and litigating it actively through the end of her employment in 2021. (See id. at 22 (describing Plaintiff’s various actions taken to oppose perceived discrimination).)
In sum, although the evidence supporting Plaintiff’s claims is thin, it is just enough to withstand summary judgment under the NYCHRL and post-amendment NYSHRL. Based on the Court’s legal error, the Court finds extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant partial vacatur of the Summary Judgment Order under Rule 60(b)(1).
Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff’s NYCHRL and post-amendment NYSHRL discrimination and retaliation claims shall proceed, including Plaintiff’s claims for harassment/hostile work environment and constructive discharge.