In O’Donnell v. Magazzino Italian Art Foundation et al, No. 25-CV-2918 (JGLC), 2026 WL 880646 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026), the court – applying the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (“EFAA”) – denied defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and stay the action.
In sum, plaintiff asserts retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) against his former employer, Magazzino Italian Art Foundation and various individuals who worked there, alleging that he was fired for complaining about women employees being treated poorly.
As to plaintiff’s standalone retaliation claim, the court explained:
Defendants argue that the EFAA does not cover standalone retaliation claims where the plaintiff does not allege experiencing sexual harassment themselves. MCA at 11–13. In support of their argument, they rely primarily on legislative history, including Congressional debates and the original proposed language of the EFAA. Id. They further claim that no case law has applied the EFAA to standalone retaliation claims of this nature. Id. at 13. Both arguments are misplaced. “When interpreting a statute, we begin with the text,” giving effect to the text’s plain meaning. Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World All. Inc., 16 F.4th 47, 57 (2d Cir. 2021). “Where the words of a statute are unambiguous, our inquiry is generally confined to the text itself.” Fowlkes v. Thomas, 667 F.3d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 2012). Defendants fail to point to any language in the statute that is ambiguous, and the Court does not find any.
The unambiguous language of the EFAA states that it applies when the case “relates to [a] … sexual harassment dispute.” 9 U.S.C. § 402(a). The Second Circuit has already determined that the EFAA, through this language, covers retaliation claims premised on reporting sexual harassment. See Olivieri, 112 F.4th at 92 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 401(4)). That is because “retaliation for reporting discrimination is reasonably related to the underlying discrimination.” Id. (cleaned up) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s claim that he was retaliated against for reporting sexual harassment is therefore related to the underlying allegations of sexual harassment.
Plaintiff is also a “person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute.” 9 U.S.C. § 402(a). The fact that there is no underlying claim for sexual harassment in this action is immaterial. Instead of requiring a plaintiff to assert a “claim” constituting a sexual harassment dispute, Congress only required a plaintiff to allege “conduct.” “Congress knows how to use the narrower term ‘claim’ when it so intends” and in fact utilized it elsewhere in the statute. Diaz-Roa, 757 F. Supp. 3d at 532 (citing Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 210 (1993)); see also Johnson, 657 F. Supp. 3d at 559 (“[The EFAA] shall apply with respect to any dispute or claim that arises or accrues on or after March 3, 2022.” (quoting Pub. L. No. 117-90, § 3, 136 Stat. 26, 28 (2022))). Courts “generally presume[ ] that when Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another, Congress intended a difference in meaning.” Maine Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 590 U.S. 296, 314 (2020) (cleaned up). Congress could have included language to limit applicability to persons who have brought claims of sexual harassment, but it did not. Thus, the Court finds no basis to draw that distinction.
Accordingly, the Court finds that a standalone retaliation claim like O’Donnell’s fits within the plain meaning of the statute.3 Plaintiff complained about workplace behavior that he alleged was wrongful, discriminatory, and ignored by management. Compl. ¶¶ 285, 288. His complaint led to at least one confrontation about its merits, in which he attributed the conduct to being about gender. See id. ¶¶ 303–11. He contends that he was subsequently fired for making these complaints and in retaliation for reporting sexual harassment. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 357–58. It is undisputed that Mr. O’Donnell does not himself allege experiencing sexual harassment, but that distinction does not appear in the EFAA itself. Thus, because the statute is unambiguous, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s standalone retaliation claim is covered by the EFAA.
Continuing, the court held that plaintiff’s claims relate to a sexual harassment dispute under New York law, finding that sexual harassment “encompasses gender-based harassment under New York law, the threshold for invoking the EFAA is met here.” The court did not assess whether plaintiff “plausibly” states a claim for sexual harassment, but rather whether he made “nonfrivolous allegations of sexual harassment, or harassment on the basis of gender, under New York law.” It found that he did so, and concluded that “the EFAA applies here because Plaintiff complained about conduct that constitutes sexual harassment under” the New York State Human Rights Law.