In Prager v. Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings, No. CV2323413 (MAS)(JBD), 2026 WL 1879303 (D.N.J. June 30, 2026), the court held that plaintiff failed to make out a hostile work environment claim in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
To succeed on a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, … [P]laintiff must establish that: (1) … she suffered intentional discrimination because of … her sex; (2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected … [P]laintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.” Wills, 814 F. Supp. 3d at 550 (citing Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013)). “To determine whether an environment is hostile, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Nitkin v. Main Line Health, 67 F.4th 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “For discrimination to constitute severe or pervasive behavior, it must ‘alter the conditions of [the plaintiff’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’ ” Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). “The Supreme Court has emphasized that ‘conduct must be extreme’ to satisfy this standard, so ‘simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)’ are inadequate.” Id. (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not met her burden in showing that her work environment was hostile. (Def.’s Moving Br. 34-35.) In opposition, Plaintiff contends that: (1) “[a] reasonable jury could … conclude that Plaintiff suffered intentional discrimination and that the totality of the circumstances constitute severe or pervasive harassment”; (2) the evidence in the record shows that Plaintiff, “a disabled female who had complained of discrimination and retaliation” was the only employee to be placed on a PIP and terminated; and (3) after Plaintiff was terminated, the evidence shows that “Defendant[ ] treated a male, non-disabled, and non-complaining employee more favorably[.]” (Pl.’s Opp’n 31-32.)
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim under Title VII fails because there are no facts in the record to show the required “severe or pervasive” conduct to establish that the workplace was “permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment[.]’ ” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations omitted). Rather, the Court notes that Plaintiff testified that Ryker “rule[d] by fear[,]” and that Ryker’s conduct was directed to all of his direct reports. (Id. at 35 (citing DSOF ¶ 9); see also, e.g., Ex. 2 to Barbatsuly Decl. 230:10-15 (“Q. All right. But, that just wasn’t directed to you, that was directed to … all of his direct reports, right? A. Correct. The only reason … I included it is because I was telling her about the fear instilled.”), ECF No. 48-5); see Cornell v. Nicholson, 318 F. App’x 75, 78 (3d Cir, 2009) (“Even the incidents in which [the named employee] harassed only men fail to show that she harassed them on the basis of their sex. [The employee’s] behavior, while clearly inappropriate, was apparently motivated by nothing more than difficult relationships and a generally hostile disposition towards coworkers, without regard to gender.”).
Moreover, the only other conduct that Plaintiff identifies in opposition to Defendant’s motion relates to the decision to place Plaintiff on a PIP and ultimately terminate her. (See Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 31-32 (citing PSOF ¶¶ 96-101, 171-76, 178).) Plaintiff otherwise does not identify any other physically threatening, humiliating, or abusive conduct that could meet the threshold required. (See generally id.); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (“The[ ] standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a ‘general civility code.’ ”); McKinnon v. Gonzales, 642 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421-22 (D.N.J. 2009) (“An unpleasant workplace does not constitute a hostile work environment … if the difficult conditions result from something other than discrimination based upon a characteristic or activity protected by Title VII…. The critical inquiry … is therefore whether [p]laintiff was subjected to pervasively abusive conditions ….” (emphasis added)). Here, Plaintiff files to cite sufficient record evidence to satisfy the “severe or pervasive” standard.
Accordingly, the court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s Title VII hostile work environment claim, with prejudice.