In McGuirk v. Noom, Inc., No. CV 24-3715-BAH, 2026 WL 1983833 (D. Md. July 9, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Here, the Court concludes that McGuirk’s retaliation claim may stand on her complaint of sexual harassment shortly before her termination, but not the alleged negative performance review by her supervisor. McGuirk’s EEOC charge states in relevant part that “McGuirk reported sexual harassment by her manager to human resources,” and “[n]othing was done to correct the problem so [McGuirk] and others continued to press for action.” ECF 16-2, at 2–3. The Court acknowledges that this allegation is not as specific as the one made in the amended complaint that McGuirk made a complaint to HR days before her termination. See ECF 16, at 3 ¶ 11. However, McGuirk’s retaliation claim, whether in her EEOC charge, original complaint, or amended complaint, was always based on reporting sexual harassment to Noom’s HR. See ECF 16-2, at 2–3; ECF 16, at 2 ¶ 4; ECF 1, at 3 ¶ 11. The timing of any complaint to HR could have been ascertained by a reasonable investigation of the facts alleged in the charge. ECF 16-2, at 2–3 (alleging that McGuirk “reported sexual harassment” to HR and “continued to press for action”). Considering the liberal construction afforded to EEOC charges, the Court concludes that the allegations in the charge and those in the amended complaint alleging sexual harassment shortly before her termination are reasonably related such that McGuirk may maintain her Title VII suit on that basis. Evans, 80 F.3d at 963. However, McGuirk may not bring the retaliation claim based on the supervisor’s attempted poor review, which was omitted entirely from her EEOC charge and does not appear to be reasonably related to the allegations raised therein.4 Cf. Kersting v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 1109, 1118 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he EEOC charge and the complaint-must, at minimum, describe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As to McGuirk’s termination, Noom contends that McGuirk’s retaliation claim nonetheless fails at causation because “way too much time elapsed from her alleged protected activity in 2021 to her termination in 2024.” ECF 17-1, at 6. At the pleading stage, McGuirk need only allege facts plausibly supporting a reasonable inference of causation. Miller v. Maryland Dep’t of Nat. Res., 813 F. App’x 869, 878 (4th Cir. 2020). “A plaintiff may attempt to demonstrate that a protected activity caused an adverse action through two routes.” Johnson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 839 F. App’x 781, 783–84 (4th Cir. 2021). “First, a plaintiff may establish that the adverse act bears sufficient temporal proximity to the protected activity.” Id. at 784 (citing Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001)). “Second, a plaintiff may establish the existence of other facts that alone, or in addition to temporal proximity, suggests that the adverse employment action occurred because of the protected activity.” Id.
Noom is correct that a three-year gap between a complaint in 2021 and termination in 2024 would be problematic for causation purposes. See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that a three-year lapse “negates any inference that a causal connection exists” between protected activity and an adverse employment action). However, McGuirk also alleges that she also made a complaint of harassment to HR “just days before she was fired.” ECF 16, at 3 ¶ 11; see also id. at 4 ¶ 14 (alleging that McGuirk was terminated “just day after making her last complaints to the Defendant’s ‘HR’ Department regarding the continued harassment”). Although McGuirk’s harassment complaint made shortly before her termination is chronicled without much detail in the amended complaint, such an allegation, taken as true, is sufficient to support a plausible inference of causation at this stage. Cf. Peterson v. Cap. One, N.A., 705 F. Supp. 3d 484, 498 (D. Md. 2023) (finding a negative comment about a plaintiff’s previous discrimination complaint just days before the plaintiff’s termination supported an inference of retaliation).
The court thus concluded that McGuirk has plausibly alleged a Title VII and MFEPA claim of retaliatory termination based on her sexual harassment complaint to HR right before her termination.