In Licea v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., No. 1:25-CV-08706, 2026 WL 2049497 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 2026), the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In sum, plaintiff, a journeyman machinist, alleges that her foreman “verbally and sexually harassed” her.
This decision provides a helpful overview of the substantive and procedural requirements that such a complaint must satisfy:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Through this statement, defendants must be provided with “fair notice” of the claim and the basis for it. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This means that the complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although a plaintiff “need not plead detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, she still must provide more than mere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action for her complaint to be considered adequate.” Bell v. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016).
“In the employment discrimination context, we have said these requirements mean a plaintiff must advance plausible allegations that she experienced discrimination because of her protected characteristics.” Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 23 F.4th 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed that this is a “minimal pleading standard.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff need only identify the type of discrimination, when it occurred, and by whom. See Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404-05 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514-15 (2002); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677).
Plaintiff’s complaint does not meet this standard. The sum total of Plaintiff’s allegations are that she was “verbally racially and sexually harassed” by her relief foreman, and suffered “medical and emotional issues” as a result. Dkt. 1 at ¶¶6-11. This is not enough. Licea “includes no factual allegations directly or indirectly connecting the [harassment] with her national original, [sex], or race… There must be some facts that make the [hostile work environment] contention plausible.” Kaminski, 23 F.4th at 776. Merely asserting that Licea was “racially and sexually harassed” does not plead any facts to support an inference that she was harassed because of her race or sex. While allegations of employment discrimination may be “general” and “conclusory,” Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081, Plaintiff’s allegations here are so conclusory that they can only fairly be characterized as “labels and conclusions.” Bell, 835 F.3d at 738.
To be sure, Plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510 (holding that elements of prima facie case of employment discrimination set out an evidentiary standard, not a pleading rule); Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Inc., 120 F.4th 1335, 1337 (7th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he time to demand evidence is the summary-judgment stage. All the complaint need do is state a grievance. Details and proofs come later.”). But she must plead some short, plain, and plausible factual narrative that conveys “a story that holds together.” Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 826-27 (7th Cir. 2014). “A litigant’s best shot at stating a plausible employment discrimination claim is to explain, in a few sentences, how she was aggrieved and what facts or circumstances lead her to believe her treatment was because of her membership in a protected class. It is the because of allegation that was missing here” for Plaintiff.
Accordingly, the court dismiss plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice, granting plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint by a date certain.