In Matthews v. United Airlines, Inc. et al, No. 2:25-CV-12895 (BRM) (LDW), 2026 WL 2588401 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2026), the court denied defendants’ motion for reconsideration of a decision denying their motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim.
From the decision:
Here, U.S. Supreme Court precedent supports this Court’s holding that Matthews’s hostile work environment claim is anchored by her termination. In Green v. Brennan, a constructive-discharge case, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the employee’s resignation is the culmination of the intolerable discriminatory conduct of the employer, such that the relevant limitation period starts with the employee’s resignation. 578 U.S. 547, 556–57 (2016) (noting in a parenthetical that a constructive discharge involves both an employee’s decision to leave and the precipitating conduct).2 The claim at issue here is a hostile work environment claim anchored by Matthews’s termination, which is in some ways distinct from a constructive-discharge claim. Still, the principle laid down in Green applies with equal force.
Here, the hostile work environment claim is made up of Matthews’s wrongful termination and other various acts that contributed to the hostile work environment. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 23–27, 29, 32–38, 58, 62, 64, 71.) Accordingly, persuaded by the reasoning in Green, the Court concluded that under the continuing violation doctrine, Plaintiff may anchor her hostile work environment claim to her termination. Matthews, 2026 WL 1283854, at *7–8 (citing Green, 578 U.S. at 557, 562 n.7).
As the Fourth Circuit has explained, “[if] a constructive discharge can be part and parcel of a discriminatory pattern of conduct, [there] [is] no reason that a discrete act [that falls within the limitations period] cannot.” Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 223 (4th Cir. 2016). This is particularly so here given the anchoring termination occurred within the limitations period. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 102 (cabining Morgan’s holding to “discrete discriminatory acts … [that] are time barred”). As another court in the Third Circuit has likewise concluded, “the timely discrete act[ ] that [Plaintiff] references may form the basis of a hostile work environment claim, such that the continuing violation doctrine would permit the Court to consider earlier hostile acts that fall outside of the limitations period.” Henderson v. Pa. State Univ., Civ. A. No. 21-0872, 2022 WL 838119, at *7–9 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2022).
Nonetheless, United argues that Heath v. City of Philadelphia teaches that the continuing violations doctrine does not apply to either untimely or timely discrete acts. (ECF No. 36-1 at 5–6 (citing Civ. A. No. 21-2309, 2022 WL 4298123, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 19, 2022)).) Heath, however, is “not an opinion of the full Court and … does not constitute binding precedent.” Id. at *n*. In other words, Heath is not a “controlling decision[ ]” the Court “overlooked.” L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). Moreover, United did not cite Heath in either its motion to dismiss or its reply in further support of its motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 19-1, 30); see also Talsania v. Kohl’s Dep’t Store, Civ. A. No. 05-3892, 2009 WL 1562325, at *2 (D.N.J. June 3, 2009) (holding an “authority[ ] presented for the first time in support of a motion for reconsideration[ ] cannot demonstrate clear error”).
As it stands, “decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits … hold[ ] that a non-time-barred discrete act may constitute an act contributing to a hostile work environment claim and therefore, may properly be the basis for applying the continuation violation doctrine.” Lee v. Mission Chevrolet, Ltd., Civ. A. No. 16-034, 2017 WL 4784368, at *8–9 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2017) (collecting cases). In the face of this consensus among three Courts of Appeals and because of United’s inability to point to a single controlling opinion from the Third Circuit (or the U.S. Supreme Court) that forecloses this Court’s holding, United has failed to show that the Court erred by allowing Matthews’s termination to anchor for her hostile work environment claim.
The court concluded that while defendant has at best identified a debatable question of law, that is not the proper basis for a motion for reconsideration.