In Pinales-Flores v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al, No. CV 25-1245 (ADC), 2026 WL 2937346 (D.P.R. Sept. 30, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
After summarizing the black-letter law governing plaintiff’s claim, the court applied it to the facts as follows:
The examples of the mocking and humiliating comments at issue, the Court recalls, are (1) “Pinales caca,” which translates to “Pinales feces,” and which plaintiff takes to refer to his race and color; and (2) “Dominican,” which plaintiff maintains is a reference to his national origin and an insinuation that he is “dumb.”8 Plaintiff does not specify either the frequency or the context for these comments, but does maintain that these were constant throughout a two-year period. The defendants argue that these allegations are insufficient to plausibly establish that Mr. López’s comments rose to the level of being “severe or pervasive” so as to alter the conditions of his employment, or that they were objectively and subjectively offensive such that a reasonable person would find them to be hostile or abusive. ECF No. 21 at 11-15; ECF No. 22 at 15-16. MBA also argues that these comments do not by themselves demonstrate discriminatory intent. ECF No. 21 at 15.
To start, the Court can understand how plaintiff may feel offended by being referred to by his last name in conjunction with an adjective such as caca or feces. That may be both objectively and subjectively offensive. The Court can further understand why plaintiff would perceive this insult as plausibly referring to his Black skin color. There is little question that, if Mr. López intended to equate feces with plaintiff’s dark skin color, his comment would be discriminatory. Also, the Court can indulge plaintiff in that being referred to as “Dominican” could plausibly be understood as an (unfair) insinuation that he is “dumb,” as he puts it. See De Los Santos Rojas v. Hosp. Español De Auxilio Mutuo de Puerto Rico, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 3d 615, 620-21 (D.P.R. 2015) (denying summary judgment to defendant on hostile work environment claim involving evidence of “name-calling, ridicule, mockery, and insult directed at Plaintiff’s Dominican accent.”).9 The Court is well aware that some people in Puerto Rico cling to an outdated and ignorant view of their island neighbors as being less educated and capable than they are. Cf. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief … requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”).
As to whether these comments were part of a pattern of harassment so severe or pervasive as to alter his conditions of employment, plaintiff’s few non-conclusory allegations present a close question for purposes of plausibility. The only two such allegations are that plaintiff felt compelled to file an internal complaint because of Mr. López’s comments and later requested a change in his schedule to avoid him. Plaintiff does not allege to have been fired, transferred, demoted, or anything similar. Apart from that, plaintiff repeats that the was subjected to “constant comments of mockery and humiliation” for much of the span of his two-year employment as of the date of the filing of the original complaint. Plaintiff gives no other context or specificity aside from the description of the two comments. Indeed, plaintiff does not say how often he interacted with Mr. López. He does not even specify whether the comments were made every time he and Mr. López interacted, only occasion, or sporadically. Plaintiff only alleges that the conduct was “constant.” Moreover, the comments do not amount to physical threats, nor was he threatened with termination. At most, they may be considered humiliating comments, but may just as well constitute mere offensive utterances.
However thin these allegations may seem, the Court must see them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. “A well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 13 (citation modified). The bottom line is that plaintiff is not required to plead each element of his prima facie claim, Frith, 38 F.4th at 271, and “[a]t the motion to dismiss phase in particular, ‘[s]ubject to some policing at the outer bounds,’ the issue of whether harassment was severe or pervasive ‘is commonly one of degree — both as to severity and pervasiveness — to be resolved by the trier of fact.’ ” Rae v. Woburn Pub. Schs., 113 F.4th 86, 111 (1st Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1431 (2025) (quoting Gorski v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 290 F.3d 466, 474 (1st Cir. 2002)). It is not unreasonable to expect that discovery “may reveal evidence sufficient to flesh out a viable claim.” Id., at 111.10 Here, after discovery, the allegations of “constant mockery and humiliation” may become a specified number of incidents that will allow the Court to properly balance the nature, frequency, and severity of Mr. López’s alleged comments. The specifics behind his internal complaint, the reasons for HR’s denial, and the effect that Mr. López’s alleged conduct had on plaintiff’s working conditions may also become apparent after the parties engage in discovery.
Based on this, the court concluded that it was unable to say that “plaintiff’s allegations, thin as they may be, do not plausibly state a claim for discriminatory hostile work environment” and that this is a “matter better left for summary judgment or trial.”