In Rowlette v. Allegheny County, No. CV 2:26-674, 2026 WL 3227967 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Pursuant to the provisions of Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge or discriminate against any individual because of that individual’s sex, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination indirectly following the shifting burden analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the existence of a prima facie case of employment discrimination is a question of law that requires a showing that: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) he/she was qualified for the position; (3) he/she was subject to an adverse employment action despite being qualified; and (4) under circumstances that raise an inference of discriminatory action.
A prima facie case may be shown “by indirect evidence whose cumulative probative force, apart from the presumption’s operation, would suffice under the controlling standard to support as a reasonable probability the inference” of discrimination. Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 162 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). See also LeBlanc v. Hill Sch., 2015 WL 144135, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2015) (to determine whether there was materially adverse employment action, the employer’s actions may be considered in the aggregate).
Further, in order to defeat a motion to dismiss, it is sufficient, but not necessary, to allege a prima facie case. Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021). “The complaint need only allege enough facts to ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [each] necessary element.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). See also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (establishing a prima facie case is an “evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.”).
Here, the allegations of the Amended Complaint sufficiently support Plaintiff’s Title VII claim. She asserts that she belongs to a protected class because she is a woman, that she was qualified for the position, that she was subjected to an adverse employment action when she was treated differently and less favorably than other employees, and that she was terminated. These facts, taken as true, raise an inference of discriminatory action.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s allegations about her termination are insufficient because she fails to assert that it occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination. It cites Johnson v. Montgomery County Ct. of Common Pleas, 2022 WL 2192946, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2022), in which a male alleged a sex discrimination claim solely on the basis that, “had he been a woman, his employer would have conducted an investigation into the false [physical assault] allegations.” The court found this speculative allegation to be insufficient.
In this case, by contrast, Plaintiff has alleged that she was treated differently as a woman from the beginning of her employment. She was assigned non-designated officers which delayed her promotion by at least two months; was subject to heightened scrutiny by Ruckel and Thornton; was told she violated protocol by reporting Officer Morrow’s interference with her handling of a situation; was subjected to a verbal attack by Officer Gannon which she reported but was ignored; was falsely accused of using 43 days of FMLA leave and pushing her work onto others; and her mere inquiry about an investigation was used as an excuse to put her on administrative leave and terminate her employment. Thus, she is not merely hypothesizing that she would have received better treatment if she had been a man but has pleaded specific examples of the different treatment she received as a woman.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff “has already provided a reason for her termination in her complaint, she inquired into an investigation she was not a part of, involving a family friend.” (ECF No. 29 at 4.) However, Plaintiff has not alleged that this was the true reason for her termination. Rather, she has only claimed that this was Defendant’s proffered justification.
(Cleaned up.)
Accordingly, the court held that dismissal was not warranted.