In Palmer v. ECapital Corp. et al, 23 Civ. 4080 (DEH). 2024 WL 3794715 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims.
In sum, plaintiff alleged that she was disparately treated as compared to her male predecessor, a male colleague who eventually replaced her, and male colleagues generally.
As to plaintiff’s claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court explained:
“[A]n inference of discrimination … arises when an employer replaces a terminated or demoted employee with an individual outside the employee’s protected class.” Id. at 312-13. Here, Plaintiff alleges that she was constructively demoted in favor of Cuttic, a white male who was less qualified for the role of CEO of ABL. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 149-151 (stating facts in support of Plaintiff’s allegation that Plaintiff’s role was diminished as Cuttic’s was elevated); id. ¶ 126 (stating that Plaintiff had sixteen years of experience at ABL, while Cuttic had seven months of experience working for eCapital). And after Defendants terminated Plaintiff, they replaced her with Cuttic. See id. ¶¶ 199-200. At this early stage of the litigation, such factual allegations are “sufficient to make plausible [Plaintiff’s] claim that her [termination] occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 313 (further noting that where a plaintiff “alleges that she was replaced by [an employee outside her protected group]” who “was less qualified for the position,” the plaintiff raised an inference of discrimination sufficient to survive dismissal).
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff was replaced as the CEO of ABL by Cuttic. See generally Mem. of L. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Br.”), ECF No. 65. Instead, they primarily argue that Plaintiff fails to allege a prima facie case of discrimination, because “[t]he only adverse action Plaintiff suffered was elimination of her job based solely on legitimate business decisions.” See Defs.’ Br. 1-2, 14, 15, 16-17. But on a motion to dismiss, the Court construes facts alleged by Plaintiff, not by Defendants, as true. See Cooper, 629 F. Supp. 3d at 228. And nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff make allegations indicating that legitimate business decisions justified her termination. Cf. Perry v. NYSARC, Inc., 424 F. App’x 23, 25 (2d Cir. 2011) (determining that the court was “not obliged to credit [the plaintiff’s] assertion that [the defendant] lacked a legitimate motive for [its actions]” in narrow circumstances where the plaintiff “admit[ted] in the complaint itself that during the relevant time period,” she could not “perform the essential functions of her job” (emphasis added)). At most, Defendants’ assertion raises a question of fact regarding their true motive(s) for terminating Plaintiff. Such questions are inappropriate to resolve at this stage. Noriega v. Abbott Lab’ys, No. 23 Civ. 4014, 2024 WL 402925, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2024) (“[G]enerally[,] a question of fact [is] not suited for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title VII employment discrimination claim survives dismissal.
And, since plaintiff sufficiently alleged discrimination under Title VII, her claims under the New York State and City Human Rights Law claims as well.