In Sabic-El-Rayess v. Teachers College, Columbia University, 24-CV-2891 (JMF), 2024 WL 4988408 (S.D.N.Y., 2024), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of religious discrimination asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
By contrast, the Court concludes that Dr. Sabic-El-Rayess’s allegations are sufficient to state claims of discrimination on the basis of religion. In arguing otherwise, Teachers College contends first that Dr. Sabic-El-Rayess fails to allege a materially adverse employment action. See Def.’s Mem. 16-20. But that is not required for her NYCHRL claim and, in any event, she does. First and foremost, she alleges that she “continuously pursued tenure-track positions through the TOO route until as recently as 2024,” SAC ¶ 65, and that her requests for such a position were “reject[ed]” in meetings on January 9, 2024, and March 11, 2024, see id. ¶¶ 188-89, 207-08. Teachers College suggests that these requests were not actual applications, see ECF No. 35 (“Def.’s Reply”), at 6 (asserting that “Plaintiff does not allege that she applied for a tenure-track position since 2013”), but that is not apparent from the face of the Complaint, especially given the distinction between the PTR and TOO processes.
In any event, Dr. Sabic-El-Rayess alleges other materially adverse employment actions. Most notably, she alleges that Teachers College reduced her regular wages in 2023 (despite previously suggesting that it would increase her regular wages). See SAC ¶¶ 26, 170-78, 236. Relying on Dr. Sabic-El-Rayess’s W2s, Teachers College challenges this allegation. See Def.’s Mem. 18, 23. But that is a factual dispute that cannot be resolved here, as the Court may not consider the W2s in this posture because, contrary to Teachers College’s assertions, they are neither incorporated into, nor integral to, the Complaint. See ASARCO LLC v. Goodwin, 756 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Pl.’s Opp’n 23-24. And additionally, Dr. Sabic-El-Rayess alleges that Teachers College disinvited and excluded her from a prominent speaking role at a symposium and failed to timely request reimbursement of approximately $170,000 in connection with a grant she had received. See SAC ¶¶ 209-34. Teachers College contends that revoking Dr. Sabic-El-Rayess’s invitation to participate in the symposium does not constitute a materially adverse employment action, see Def.’s Mem. 18-19, but that is not necessarily so in light of the Supreme Court’s recent clarification that a plaintiff need not show that adverse action “was significant[,]” “serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar[ ]” to prevail on a Title VII claim. Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 144 S. Ct. 967, 974 (2024) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Leget v. Henderson, Nos. 99-CV-3636 (DLC) et al., 2001 WL 43615, at *5 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2001) (observing that the standard for what qualifies as an adverse action is the same under Title VII and the ADEA).
In the alternative, Teachers College argues that Dr. Sabic-El-Rayess fails to allege any facts sufficient to support an inference of discrimination. See Def.’s Mem. 20-21. But drawing all inferences in her favor, the Court once again disagrees. Among other things, a factfinder could infer that Teachers College’s rationale for revoking Dr. Sabic-El-Rayess’s invitation to speak at the symposium — that her participation would somehow make the “space” less “safe” — drew on Islamophobic stereotypes. See SAC ¶¶ 216-21; see also, e.g., Bergesen v. Manhattanville College, No. 20-CV-3689 (KMK), 2021 WL 3115170, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2021) (“The presence of stereotyping may support the inference that an adverse action was due to a protected characteristic.”). In addition, the Complaint alleges (albeit admittedly somewhat conclusorily) that no Muslim has ever received a tenure-track or tenured position at Teachers College despite many qualified Muslim applicants, see SAC ¶ 110; and that leaders of Teachers College have made remarks that could be construed as anti-Muslim and disparaged academic pursuits involving Islam, see id. ¶¶ 113-29. These allegations, combined with Teachers College’s purportedly unprecedented request that Dr. Sabic-El-Rayess compile a dossier in connection with her application for reappointment to a non-tenure-track position, see id. ¶¶ 183-85, and its arguably false rationale — a lack of peer-reviewed publications — for its refusal in January 2024 to place Dr. Sabic-El-Rayess on any sort of expedited path toward tenure consideration, see id. ¶¶ 190-204, are enough to survive a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 381 (2d Cir. 2001) (observing that a jury may draw “reasonable inference[s]” from “the proffer of a false reason” for an adverse employment action, including “the required ultimate finding of discrimination”); Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of New York, 131 F.3d 305, 313 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Departures from procedural regularity … can raise a question as to the good faith of the process where the departure may reasonably affect the decision.” (cleaned up)).2
Based on this, the court held that plaintiff’s religious discrimination claims survive.