Sex Discrimination Claims Dismissed Against Con Edison

In Goldzweig v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., 2024 WL 5056350 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2024), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claim of gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

From the decision:

Plaintiff’s federal and state gender discrimination claims fail at the fourth step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis because Plaintiff has not raised any inference of gender discrimination as to her termination. To support an inference of discriminatory intent, a Title VII plaintiff must allege facts supporting her claim that her “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision” about which she complains. Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87 (2d Cir. 2015). “[T]he ‘ultimate issue’ in an employment discrimination case is whether the plaintiff has met her burden of proving that the adverse employment decision was motivated at least in part by an ‘impermissible reason,’ i.e., a discriminatory reason.”

Plaintiff contends that she was subjected to treatment different than that of her male counterparts, She again points specifically to D’Angelo’s feedback on her status reports as compared to his feedback to the male employee, and generally to D’Angelo’s “humiliating and differential treatment.” However, as discussed above, these allegations are insufficient to give rise to an inference of discrimination. Just as Plaintiff failed to show age motivated D’Angelo’s actions regarding her status reports, she has failed to show any evidence of gender animus. Furthermore, as explained, Plaintiff’s general allegations of mistreatment fail to give rise to any inference of gender discrimination. …

Plaintiff also argues that D’Angelo made comments regarding her appearance and smell that show sex-based animus. (Opp. at 11.) However, Plaintiff has failed to offer concrete, substantial evidence regarding any such comments. Plaintiff’s only evidence regarding alleged sexist comments comes from her own vague deposition testimony. (Goldzweig Dep. Tr. at 281:15–18.) (“I think I was criticized for my clothing. I think I was criticized for the oil I put on my skin. Everything was criticized, if you will.”) When asked specifically when D’Angelo criticized her clothing and what he said, Plaintiff responded, “I don’t recall.” (Goldzweig Dep. Tr. at 282:21—283:6.) Similarly, Plaintiff testified that she could not recall any specific comments D’Angelo made regarding the oil on her skin. (Goldzweig Dep. Tr. at 284:13–15) (“I think he suggested he didn’t – he said, oh, I don’t know – he made a comment about my smell.”). Thus, Plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence to support an inference of discrimination.

Ultimately, Plaintiff has failed to offer concrete evidence of gender discrimination. Importantly, both Plaintiff’s temporary and permanent replacements were women, which further undercuts an inference of discrimination.

[Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]

The court further dismissed plaintiff’s claim under the New York City Human Rights Law, finding that plaintiff failed to adduce evidence to support the claim that defendant treated her “less well” on the basis of her gender.

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