In Fields v. Louis DeJoy, in his official capacity as Postmaster General of the United States, Case No.: 7:24-cv-01182-RDP, 2025 WL 1436563 (N.D.Ala. May 19, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment sexual harassment asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Plaintiff bases her hostile work environment claim on several instances of alleged sexual harassment by Tolliver. Specifically, she points to the following: when Tolliver showed Plaintiff a picture of Bowens in the shower with his tongue out (Doc. # 1 ¶ 17); when Tolliver told Plaintiff that Bowens wanted to have sex with her and Tolliver wanted to join (id. ¶¶ 18-19); when Tolliver told Plaintiff she would not have to work certain undesirable shifts if she had sex with her and Bowens (id. ¶ 20); when Tolliver texted Plaintiff an unsolicited, explicit photo of her breasts (id. ¶ 22); and when Tolliver sent Plaintiff an unsolicited, explicit video of her and Bowens having sex. (Id. ¶ 23).
Defendant argues that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly rejected hostile work environment claims based on more serious conduct than is present here.” (Doc. # 9 at 21). To support this argument, Defendant cites to several Eleventh Circuit cases rejecting hostile work environment claims. (Id. at 21-22 (citing Henderson v. Waffle House, Inc., 238 F. App’x 499, 502 (11th Cir. 2007); Mitchell v. Pope, 189 F. App’x 911, 914 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006); Mendoza v. Borden, 195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999); Smart v. City of Miami Beach, 933 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2013), aff’d 567 F. App’x 820 (11th Cir. 2014))). However, each of those cases was decided on appeal from a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law, not on a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, unlike the courts in those cases, this court is tasked with merely determining whether Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim as pleaded is “plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
If true, the facts alleged by Plaintiff show that Tolliver’s conduct was frequent and more than “a mere offensive utterance.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. The court also finds it plausible that being subjected to frequent sexual advances and receiving multiple unsolicited, explicit photos and videos from a supervisor – as Plaintiff alleges she was – would be “humiliating” and could have “unreasonably interfere[d] with [Plaintiff’s] work performance.” Id. Thus, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to establish the fourth element of her hostile work environment – that the harassment she faced was severe and pervasive.
The court further rejected defendant’s reliance on the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense – based on its argument that there was no “tangible employment action” – since the litigation is at the pleading stage, and based on Eleventh Circuit law that “[a] complaint need not anticipate and negate affirmative defenses and should not ordinarily be dismissed based on an affirmative defense unless the defense is apparent on the fac[e] of the complaint.”