In Shinn v. Pennsylvania School Boards Association, CIVIL NO. 1:23-cv-02097, 2025 WL 1839494 (M.D.Pa. July 3, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Here, Shinn’s alleged workplace harassment was neither severe nor pervasive. In the complaint, Shinn alleges a number of incidents that she contends crossed the line of appropriate workplace conduct: (1) Smeltzer discussed his son’s circumcision with Shinn in his office with the door closed (doc. 1 ¶¶ 23–28); (2) Smeltzer invited Shinn out for beer (which she declined) (id. ¶¶ 29–32); (3) Smeltzer, while alone with Shinn in his office, made a reference to students inputting numbers to spell “boobs” on graphing calculators (id. ¶¶ 42–47); (4) Smeltzer told Shinn in a closed-door meeting that he was getting a vasectomy and then, during several subsequent meetings, Smeltzer commented on his pain and discomfort after the procedure (id. ¶¶ 48–52); and (5) Smeltzer criticized the work product of Nathalia and Shinn and said words to the effect of “there aren’t enough white men in some of the stuff we push out and it makes me uncomfortable” (id. ¶ 34). Notably, these incidents occurred over a period of four-to-five-months.
Overall, while Shinn points to comments that she felt were inappropriate, they fall in the category of isolated and offhand remarks, none of which was severe, physical threatening, or humiliating. And isolated and offhand comments are insufficient to create a hostile work environment. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (1998) (stating that offhand comments are not sufficient to establish a hostile-work environment); Greer v. Mondelez Global, Inc., 590 F. App’x 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014) (stating that offensive utterances are not sufficient to create a hostile environment).
We are mindful that, in analyzing whether there are allegations that could support a hostile work environment, we cannot look at statements of incidents in isolation. Rather, we must consider the totality of the circumstances and the entire scenario regarding Shinn’s work environment. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (“[W]hether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances.”); Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he advent of more sophisticated and subtle forms of discrimination requires that we analyze the aggregate effect of all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, including those concerning incidents of facially neutral mistreatment, in evaluating a hostile work environment claim.”); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990) (“A play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire performance, and similarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents, but on the overall scenario.”). Thus, we consider the comments cited by Shinn along with the other alleged conduct and incidents that form Shinn’s hostile-work-environment claims. See Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 264 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Although the racist comments involved in this case cannot alone be the basis of a hostile work environment claim, evidence of those comments may be considered in determining whether facially neutral conduct … was actually based on Davis’ race.”); see also Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. CIV.A. 09-0774, 2013 WL 1628608, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2013), aff’d, 636 F. App’x 831 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding “sporadic references to [the plaintiff] as ‘honey’ and [an] offhanded comment about [the plaintiff] getting clients to see past her pretty face,” along with comments not directed at the plaintiff did not “rise to the level of extreme conduct sufficient to change the terms and conditions of [the plaintiff’s] employment.”).
Here, Shinn describes concerns that Smeltzer was “sabotaging” her work and that on one occasion he edited her work without admitting he did so. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 68, 70–72. Shinn also alleges that another person in the workplace (Nathalia) had a problem with Smeltzer and refused to have future one-on-one meetings with him. Id. ¶ 56. These vague allegations, however, do little to advance her hostile-work-environment claim. Shinn does not allege that she witnessed any inappropriate behavior by Smeltzer towards Nathalia, or even that she was aware of the cause of Nathalia’s complaints. Moreover, Shinn does not expand on how Smeltzer was “sabotaging” her work. Viewing all the circumstances alleged by Shinn, we conclude that she has failed to allege that she experienced severe or pervasive discrimination.
The court did, however, grant plaintiff leave to amend her complaint as to her hostile work environment claims, noting that plaintiff should include any additional allegations about her workplace conditions that rise to the level of the applicable standard.