In Maresca v. Richmond University Medical Center, 22-CV-6636(EK)(MMH), 2025 WL 2482010 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s religious-based hostile work environment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Maresca alleges that “Mr. Musselwhite, head lawyer for HR” condescendingly told her that she “should be fine with the vaccine as [her] pope OK’d it,” in response to her question about religious exemptions. Am. Compl. 6. She also alleges that it was humiliating to fill out a questionnaire about her religious beliefs following her religious exemption request. See id. Notwithstanding these allegations, Maresca has not plausibly pleaded a hostile work environment.
To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege conduct that “(1) is objectively severe or pervasive, that is, creates an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive; (2) that the plaintiff subjectively perceives as hostile or abusive; and (3) creates such an environment because of the plaintiff’s [protected characteristic].” Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007). Harassment is “severe and pervasive” when the workplace is permeated with so much “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” as to “alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986). At the same time, “offhand comments” and “isolated incidents of offensive conduct (unless extremely serious) will not support a claim of discriminatory harassment.” Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 223 (2d Cir. 2004). Thus, a plaintiff alleging a hostile work environment “must demonstrate either that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of [the] working environment.” Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002).
The instant complaint does not come close to meeting this standard. The “head lawyer” may have exhibited poor taste when he presumed to characterize the Pope’s views.6 But that single comment is insufficiently offensive to meet the “severe or pervasive” prong. Courts have held more frequent and more egregious remarks about religion not to qualify. See, e.g., Freud v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 22-879, 2023 WL 3103588, at *3 (2d Cir. Apr. 27, 2023) (plaintiff’s allegations of a supervisor’s remarks that “Jews have it made” and asking if Jews “leave early from [their] job[s] on Fridays” established, at most, episodic remarks expressing ignorance and dislike of religious observance rather than a workplace permeated with discrimination); Chukwueze v. NYCERS, 891 F. Supp. 2d 443, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (three instances where plaintiff was “chastised” or “berated” for requesting a religious accommodation were “mere offensive utterance[s]” and were thus neither severe nor pervasive enough to constitute harassment).
Furthermore, Maresca does not plausibly allege that the questions on the accommodation questionnaire were directed at her because of her Catholic and Christian faith. The questionnaire’s language makes clear that it was given to all covered personnel who sought a religious exemption. See Am. Compl. 19 (RUMC religious accommodation form, stating, “Please identify the religious belief, practice, or observance that is causing you to seek the accommodation ….”). Rather than constituting harassment based upon religion, the form indicates a willingness to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs to the extent possible under the law.
Based on this, the court held that plaintiff did not state a hostile work environment claim.