In Santana v. Shook Hardy & Bacon, 2025 WL 2521193 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2025), the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.
From the decision:
Plaintiff’s Complaint is premised on unprofessional treatment he endured at the hands of Defendants. Compl. 8–10; Dkt. No. 22, Ex. H. Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL, however, do not serve to remedy non-discriminatory workplace grievances. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)); Soloviev v. Goldstein, 104 F. Supp. 3d 232, 248–49 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2013) (“When applying this standard, however, district courts must be mindful that the NYCHRL is not a general civility code. The plaintiff still bears the burden of showing that the conduct is caused by a discriminatory motive. It is not enough that a plaintiff has an overbearing or obnoxious boss.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Instead, the anti-discrimination statutes invoked in the Complaint prohibit employers and employment agencies from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, including an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct, however, is not actionable under these statutes. See Soloviev, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 248–49.
The facts alleged in the Complaint—that Plaintiff was mistreated at work and ultimately terminated for various actions, including applying for a new position and refusing a managing partner’s request—do not suggest that any protected characteristics like race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, were a motivating factor. Moreover, his assertions that he experienced “unlawful discrimination, [a] hostile work environment, retaliation … [and] differential treatment,” are conclusory and do not support a claim for discrimination under any of the statutes invoked. Dkt. No. 22, Ex. H. at 2.
Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff’s allegations did not state a claim under the aforementioned statutes.