In Twedell v. Senior Living Management Group, LLC, No. 6:25-CV-03214-MDH, 2025 WL 2988461 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 23, 2025), the court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for sexual harassment under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, and, upon applying the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), denied defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff’s claims.
In sum, plaintiff alleges that she endured harassment based on sex, in that she was called offensive names by a coworker due to her clothing appearance and further targeted for verbal threats and attempted assaults by a different coworker allegedly due to her sex, and, after reporting the harassment, was retaliated against in the form of further harassment and termination of her employment.
From the decision:
The EFAA applies to actions involving a “sexual harassment dispute” or “sexual assault dispute.” 9 U.S.C. § 402. Sexual assault dispute “means a dispute involving a nonconsensual sexual act or sexual contact, including penis penetration as to the vulva or anus, contact between the mouth and penis, vulva, or anus, penetration of the anal or genital opening of another by hand, finger, or other object with an intent to abuse, harass, arouse, etc., and/or the intentional touching of genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of another with intent to abuse, harass, arouse, etc.” 9 U.S.C. § 401(3); 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)-(3). Sexual harassment dispute is defined to include “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable … Federal … law.” 9 U.S.C. § 401(4).
Plaintiff alleges she was subjected to harassment based on sex while employed by Defendant. (Compl. ¶8). She alleges a co-worker of Plaintiff called Plaintiff a “disgusting whore” for wearing leggings to work. (Compl. ¶9). Following that incident, Plaintiff alleges she was subjected to harassment by a male dietary aid. (Compl. ¶15). He would scream in Plaintiff’s face and state that he wanted to fight Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶16). When Plaintiff complained, he continued to harass Plaintiff by hitting Plaintiff with the stockroom door, disrupting the desert cart after Plaintiff prepared it, yelling at Plaintiff, and refusing to do his job. (Compl. ¶21-22).
The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff does not allege sexual assault as defined by federal law. However, whether Plaintiff’s claims qualify as sexual harassment requires a more thorough analysis. To make a claim for sexual harassment against an employer for sexual harassment by coworkers, Plaintiff must show: “(1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action.” See Gibson v. Concrete Equip. Co., Inc., 960 F.3d 1057, 1063 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th Cir. 2016)). For the fourth element the environment must be both objectively and subjectively hostile. Id.
At this stage, the Court considers this motion as a motion to dismiss because the Court is relying only on the pleadings and documents embraced by the pleadings. See City of Benkelman v. Baseline Eng’g Corp., 867 F.3d 875, 881-82 (8th Cir. 2017); see also Enervations, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 380 F.3d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 2004). At the motion to dismiss stage, a complaint must contain factual allegations that, when accepted as true, are sufficient to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face. Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Court “must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). The complaint’s factual allegations must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and the motion to dismiss must be granted if the complaint does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). Further, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
While Plaintiff’s complaint does contain conclusory statements, there are facts within the complaint that, when accepted as true, would allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference in favor of the Plaintiff asserting a right to relief above the speculative level for a sexual harassment claim. She alleges that, while an employee of Defendant, she was subjected to harassment allegedly based on sex, in that she was called offensive names by a coworker due to her clothing appearance and further targeted for verbal threats and attempted assaults by a different coworker allegedly due to her sex (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9, 15, 16, 21, 22, e.g.). She further alleges that she reported the harassment to her supervisors and was subject to retaliation in the form of further harassment and termination of her employment.
(Cleaned up.)
Based on this, the court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss or stay proceedings and compel arbitration.