In Brown v. Montefiore Health System, Inc., No. 24-3078-cv, 2025 WL 2985389 (2d Cir. Oct. 23, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that plaintiff indeed stated a claim for a race-based hostile work environment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law.
From the decision:
To state a hostile work environment claim, “a plaintiff must plead facts that would tend to show that the complained of conduct: (1) is objectively severe or pervasive—that is, creates an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive; (2) creates an environment that the plaintiff subjectively perceives as hostile or abusive; and (3) creates such an environment because of the plaintiff’s [protected class].” Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Ultimately, to avoid dismissal under [Rule] 12(b)(6), a plaintiff need only plead facts sufficient to support the conclusion that she was faced with harassment of such quality or quantity that a reasonable employee would find the conditions of her employment altered for the worse.” Id. (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In considering whether a plaintiff has stated a hostile work environment claim, “courts should examine the totality of the circumstances, including: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with the victim’s job performance.” Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 20 (2d Cir. 2014) (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In addition to the allegations summarized above in connection with the disparate treatment claim, the amended complaint contains other allegations of Pappo’s treatment of Brown in support of the hostile work environment claim based on her race. For example, it alleges that “[Brown] was left out of research assignments, had duties and responsibilities removed from her without notice, [and was] berated and demeaned before her colleagues.” App’x at 28. The amended complaint further alleges that Brown was subject to “excessive scrutinization and micromanaging of her work, actions[,] and whereabouts, [ ] isolation from her co-workers, [the] removal of duties and responsibilities, [and the] denial of professional opportunities” which, “coupled with the continuous denial of her rightfully earned benefits, [was] all a part of the ongoing discrimination which [ ] created a very hostile work environment affecting [her] physical, mental and emotional” condition. Id. If proven, the alleged conduct, when considered in its totality and construed in the light most favorable to Brown, could plausibly be sufficiently pervasive or severe to constitute a hostile work environment.
Moreover, although these alleged instances are not specifically linked to Plaintiff’s status in a protected class (such as with specific alleged comments), it is well-settled that “[f]acially neutral incidents may be included, of course, among the ‘totality of the circumstances’ that courts consider in any hostile work environment claim.” Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 378 (2d Cir. 2002). Again, in reviewing the totality of the circumstances, especially where Brown alleges that she and two other named Black co-workers were treated differently than similarly situated white co-workers in a number of material respects, she has plausibly alleged that the alleged harassment could be related to her status in a protected class, even if such status was not referenced specifically by anyone in connection with the alleged conduct.
Based on this, the court held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged a plausible hostile work environment claim.