In Lia-Basile v. the County of Albany et al, No. 1:25-CV-0291 (GTS/MJK), 2025 WL 3019150 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2025), the court, inter alia, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of sex/gender discrimination asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, on the ground that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies at the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
From the decision:
As a precondition to filing a Title VII claim in federal court, a plaintiff must pursue available administrative remedies and file a timely complaint with the EEOC.” Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dept., 879 F.3d 486, 499 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Deravin v. Keriik, 335 F.3d 195, 200 [2d Cir. 2003]). Although exhaustion is an essential requirement for a Title VII claim, the Second Circuit has “repeatedly held that ‘failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a precondition to bringing a Title VII claim in federal court, rather than a jurisdictional requirement,’ ” and thus “is ‘subject to equitable defenses.’ ” Hardaway, 879 F.3d at 489-90 (quoting Francis v. City of New York, 235 F.3d 763, 768 [2d Cir. 2000]; Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 385 [2d Cir. 2015]). As an affirmative defense, the burden to show that a plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies rests on the defendant. Hardaway, 879 F.3d at 490-91. The Second Circuit has also recognized that, in situations where an EEOC charge has been filed, “claims that were not asserted before the EEOC may be pursued in a subsequent federal court action if they are reasonably related to those that were filed with the agency.” Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 77 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Deravin, 335 F.3d at 200).
Plaintiff argues in her sur-reply that she included various claims and allegations beyond discrimination under the ADA and ADEA in her EEOC charge, but that the EEOC “decided to focus on the Age and Disability discriminations” in their investigation while telling her that her other claims and charges “would be discussed when the case goes to court.” (Dkt. No. 1, at 24.) As an initial matter, Defendants do not ever argue that Plaintiff’s EEOC charge was limited solely to discrimination, merely that it was limited to claims based on her age and disability (which are not covered by Title VII). As a result, to the extent that Plaintiff has alleged retaliation, denial of work or promotions, denial of pay, and hostile work environment based on her age or disability in the EEOC charge, Defendants have not challenged the exhaustion of such claims, nor does the Court find those claims to not be reflected in (or at the very least related to) the charge. (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1, at 51-52.) What Defendants do argue is that Plaintiff’s EEOC charge does not reflect any claim (whether it be discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, or any other action) based on her sex or gender that would implicate Title VII.
The failure to make any allegations of sex or gender claims is obvious from a consideration of the EEOC charge itself and the EEOC’s response to that charge following its investigation. Plaintiff specifically states multiple times in the charge that the adverse actions taken against her were because of her age and disability, but never once mentions sex or gender. (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1, at 51-52.) Likewise, the EEOC’s decision letter does not provide any indication that it was on notice of or investigated any allegations regarding treatment based on sex or gender as opposed to age and disability. (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1, at 5.) In a statement submitted with her Complaint that appears to have been provided by her to the EEOC as part of the investigation process, Plaintiff herself states multiple times that when she had reported the conduct to her employer, they erroneously treated those complaints as being related to sexual harassment or her asserting that she was being treated differently because she was a woman, but that “those are not what my concerns were,” and she clarified that the real nature of her complaints was harassment and unfair treatment based on her age and disability. (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1, at 83-84.) Based on the evidence provided, there is simply nothing to suggest that Plaintiff ever even attempted to raise a claim based on her sex or gender (or any other characteristic protected by Title VII) when she filed the EEOC charge, and thus she has not exhausted any claim pursuant to Title VII.
Nor is there any basis for finding that claims of sex or gender discrimination (or retaliation or hostile work environment) are reasonably related to the age and disability claims that were raised in the EEOC charge. “A claim is considered reasonably related if the conduct complained of would fall within the scope of the EEOC investigation which can be reasonably expected to grow out of the charge that was made.” Deravin, 335 F.3d at 200-01 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 359-60 [2d Cir. 2001]). Again, Plaintiff very specifically states that the actions were taken against her based on her age and disability, and she specifically denied in subsequent information she provided to the EEOC that sex or gender discrimination was one of her concerns. None of what was provided to the EEOC would alert it to the possibility that Plaintiff intended to allege any claim based on her sex or gender.
Based on this, the court held that plaintiff’s Title VII sex/gender discrimination claims have not been exhausted, and dismissed them without prejudice.