In Dranitca v. Allied Universal Sec. Services LLC, No. 150492/2025, 2025 WL 2814548 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sep. 26, 2025), an employment discrimination case, the court discussed and applied New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 205, which governs the timeframe in which to recommence an action in one forum after being dismissed in another.
Here, plaintiff asserted claims claims of hostile work environment, retaliation, and sex discrimination in federal court. That court dismissed plaintiff’s federal claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but permitted plaintiff to retain her right to recommence her claims under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws in state court – which she did.
Here, the court held that since plaintiff did not file and serve her complaint within the 6 month period specified by CPLR 205(a), her complaint was dismissed as time-barred.
From the decision:
Plaintiff’s claims under Executive Law § 296 are governed by a three-year statute of limitation set forth in CPLR 214(2). Plaintiff’s claims under Administrative Codes §§ 8-101 and 8-107 also have a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to Administrative Code § 8-502(d). Plaintiff first filed their Federal Action on June 17, 2022, well within the three year statute of limitations. Subsequently, a Stipulation of Dismissal was so-ordered in the Federal Action on July 12, 2024.
The Stipulation of Dismissal in the Federal Action provided that the dismissal in that action was “(3) without prejudice as to Plaintiff’s right to commence any action upon her state and city claims in state court pursuant to the authority of Section 205 of the CPLR.” (NYSCEF Doc No. 7).
CPLR 205(a) provides that Plaintiff “may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences within six months after the termination provided that the new action would have been timely commenced at the time of commencement of the prior action and that service upon defendant is effected within such six-month period.” That six-month period has been understood to mean both the filing of a new action and completing proper service upon Defendants in that same six-month period. (Pyne v 20 E. 35 Owners Corp., 267 AD2d 168, 169 [1st Dept 1999]).
Here, Plaintiff and moving Defendants subsequently filed a stipulation accepting service of the instant complaint on March 3, 2025. (NYSCEF Doc No. 9). That stipulation, in part, was conditioned on the fact that “Allied Universal and Tompkins do not waive any available **4 defenses.” Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that they had difficulties effectuating service; however there is no evidence in the record of such attempts or what difficulties counsel had in effectuating service. Moreover, as the parties in this case are the same as the parties in the prior Federal Case, the court has not been made aware of any reasons why effectuating service upon Defendants could not be completed within the six-month period allotted by CPLR 205(a). As such, Plaintiff’s claim is untimely, Defendants’ motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed.
Accordingly, the court held that dismissal was warranted.