In Osei v. The Bookdale Hospital Medical Center et al, No. 25-CV-3893 (NGG) (JRC), 2026 WL 1133246 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s religion-based discrimination claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).
From the decision:
It is unlawful under Title VII “for an employer … to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s … religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). At the motion to dismiss stage, a Title VII plaintiff “need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002). She only needs to allege that she is (1) “is a member of a protected class,” (2) “was qualified” for her role, (3) “suffered an adverse employment action,” and (4) “has at least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.”7 Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015). A plaintiff can satisfy the fourth element through “de minimis” circumstantial evidence, drawing inference from “more favorable treatment to employees not in the protected group” or from “the sequence of events leading to the plaintiff’s discharge.”8 Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Osei has satisfied her burden to allege all four Littlejohn elements. 795 F.3d at 311. First, she “is a member of a protected class.” Id. True, “[t]he only statement [she] makes as to her own religious beliefs is … ‘non-membership in [Dr. Esan’s] [c]hurch.’ ” (Mot. at 9 (quoting Compl. ¶ 77).) Title VII, however, protects employees not only from discrimination against their own religion, but also from discrimination for failing to share an employer’s religion. Mandell, 316 F.3d at 378; (see Defs.’ Reply Mem. of L. (“Reply”) (Dkt. 13-4) at 1-2 (appearing to accept the validity of “reverse religious discrimination” claims). Thus, Osei has satisfied the first Littlejohn element. See 795 F.3d at 311.
Second, Osei has readily pled that she “was qualified” for her position as a SICU nurse. Id. A plaintiff may “satisfy this burden by showing that she possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of the job.” Kovaco v. Rockbestos-Surprenant Cable Corp., 834 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2016). “[T]he inference of minimal qualification is not difficult to draw” in cases like here “where discharge is at issue and the employer has already hired the employee.” Id. (citing Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2001)). Osei was a practicing nurse for over twenty years when Brookdale hired her and was independently referred by DirectShifts, an agency specializing in placement of healthcare workers. (Opp’n at 9 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 14-15); see Compl. ¶ 16.) The Defendants do not contest as much in their own briefing. Thus, Osei has satisfied the second Littlejohn element. See 795 F.3d at 311.
Third, Osei has “pled that she was subject to the ultimate adverse employment action—termination.”9 (Opp’n at 9 (citing Compl. ¶ 69)); see Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that termination constitutes an adverse employment action). The Defendants’ response is more distraction than rebuttal. (Mot. at 10-11.) They home in on Osei’s dispute with Grant, observing that Osei “suffered no adverse consequences over the argument.” (Mot. at 11; Reply at 7.) That may be. But Osei was still terminated. (Compl. ¶ 69.) Losing her job is an unequivocally adverse employment action that handily satisfies the third Littlejohn element. See 795 F.3d at 311; Terry, 336 F.3d at 138. Fourth, Osei satisfies the intent element because she plausibly demonstrates that Brookdale’s decision to terminate her was “based on [her] failure to adopt or follow [Dr. Esan]’s religious beliefs.” United Health Programs of Am., 213 F. Supp. 3d at 392; see Mandell, 316 F.3d at 378. Osei plausibly alleges that that Dr. Esan gave “more favorable treatment” to SICU staff members that attended or otherwise supported his church. Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 468. As she explains, this treatment included “favorable work assignments and protection from employee discipline.” (Opp’n at 10 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 23-24).) Other staff members, Osei contends, “were given less favorable work assignments and subjected to false disciplinary reports (including baseless and fabricated charges of inadequate patient care) and unwarranted disciplinary actions.”
The Defendants’ response misunderstands what is required to defeat a Title VII motion to dismiss. They note that Osei “does not allege that she herself had ever received less favorable work assignments than employees allegedly associated with Dr. Esan’s church.” (Id. at 10; Reply at 3-4.) They then state that her allegations regarding Dr. Esan’s treatment of others are “vague” and “conclusory.” (Mot. at 11.) If the Defendants had their way, Osei would need to list “the names of the employees allegedly involved, the date of their complaint(s), the exact nature of their complaints, and what adverse employment action was taken against the employees.”10 (Id. (Compl. ¶¶ 26-29).) The Defendants’ articulation of the law is not supported by citation to caselaw, and the burden that Osei faces at this stage is “minimal.” See Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 311. Her detailed allegations of differential treatment meet the moment. See Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 468.
Osei also provides an independent ground to satisfy the fourth Littlejohn element. 795 F.3d at 311. As she explains, “the events leading up to her termination also support an inference of discrimination.” (Opp’n at 10); see Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 468. Prior to her termination, Osei had a 22-year career and no prior history of inadequate patient care at Brookdale. (Opp’n at 10; see Compl. ¶¶ 14, 20-21.) A colleague then warned Osei that a SICU Director of Nursing—a member of Dr. Esan’s church—was soliciting complaints against her. (Id. (citing Compl. ¶ 50).) She was suspended within a few days, and then Brookdale fired her. (Id.; see Compl. ¶¶ 51, 69.)
The Defendants’ response to these allegations is equally unpersuasive. They characterize her “factual allegations … as nothing more than pure speculation,” which lack support beyond a “series of conclusory statements that do no more than recite the elements of the cause of action.” (Mot. at 9 (citing Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F. 3d 72, 87 (2d Cir. 2015).)
When these allegations are stripped away, the Defendants argue that Osei “merely alleges that she was investigated over a report that she had improperly endangered a patient” and was terminated thereafter. (Id. at 12 (citing Compl. ¶ 51).) It is unclear how the Defendants reach that conclusion. Osei detailed “the sequence of events leading to [her] discharge,” thereby raising a plausible inference that Dr. Esan acted against her with discriminatory intent.
(Cleaned up.)
Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff plausibly alleged under Title VII that Dr. Esan took discriminatory actions against her.
The court further held that plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to attribute Dr. Esan’s discriminatory actions to Brookdale, noting that plaintiff alleged that Dr. Esan “exercised control over the conditions of employment of nurses and other staff” and that he “played a meaningful role” in her termination.
Accordingly, plaintiff sufficiently alleged discrimination under Title VII. She therefore necessarily stated claims under the comparatively broader NYSHRL and NYCHRL.