In Watson v. Metro. Transit Auth., 248 A.D.3d 1158 (N.Y. App. Div. 2026), the court, inter alia, held that a release did not apply to bar plaintiff’s employment discrimination action.
From the decision:
Generally, a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release” (Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 N.Y.3d 269, 276, 929 N.Y.S.2d 3, 952 N.E.2d 995 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Applewhite v. 112 Liberty Assoc., LLC, 233 A.D.3d 834, 834, 223 N.Y.S.3d 275). “A release may be invalidated, however, for any of the traditional bases for setting aside written agreements, namely, duress, illegality, fraud, or mutual mistake” (Applewhite v. 112 Liberty Assoc., LLC, 233 A.D.3d at 834, 223 N.Y.S.3d 275 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wei Qiang Huang v. Llerena–Salazar, 222 A.D.3d 1033, 1033, 203 N.Y.S.3d 341). “[A] signed release shifts the burden … to the [plaintiff] to show that there has been fraud, duress or some other fact which will be sufficient to void the release” (Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 N.Y.3d at 276, 929 N.Y.S.2d 3, 952 N.E.2d 995 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Ming Long Liu v. Kirkwood, 222 A.D.3d 861, 862, 199 N.Y.S.3d 705).
“In resolving a motion for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), the plaintiff’s allegations are to be treated as true, all inferences that reasonably flow therefrom are to be resolved in his or her favor, and where, as here, the plaintiff has submitted an affidavit in opposition to the motion, it is to be construed in the same favorable light” (Applewhite v. 112 Liberty Assoc., LLC, 233 A.D.3d at 835, 223 N.Y.S.3d 275 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wei Qiang Huang v. Llerena–Salazar, 222 A.D.3d at 1034, 203 N.Y.S.3d 341).
Here, in support of their motion, the defendants submitted, inter alia, a copy of the release signed by the plaintiff, the NYCTA, and the plaintiff’s union representative, which, by its terms, barred this action against the defendants (see Wei Qiang Huang v. Llerena–Salazar, 222 A.D.3d at 1034, 203 N.Y.S.3d 341). In opposition, however, the allegations in the plaintiff’s affidavit were sufficient to raise questions of fact as to whether the release was signed by the plaintiff under circumstances that indicate unfairness and whether it was not “fairly and knowingly” made (Sacchetti–Virga v. Bonilla, 158 A.D.3d 783, 784, 73 N.Y.S.3d 194 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The plaintiff averred, among other things, that he “did not sign [the] agreement voluntarily,” “was not given a chance to thoroughly read the agreement before [he] signed it,” “was never told that the agreement would somehow bar [him] from bringing claims of discrimination or failure to accommodate based on [his] medical marijuana prescription,” and “was not told to consult with an attorney, nor was [he] given time to contact an attorney.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court should not have granted the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action was barred by the release.
However, the court held that the Supreme Court should have granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action, under CPLR 3211(a)(7). Specifically, the court held that plaintiff failed to make out claims for disability discrimination, as well as hostile work environment.