In Pusey, Audrey v. Florida Atlantic University Board of Trustees, No. 25-CV-81619, 2026 WL 1792786 (S.D. Fla. June 23, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s sex-based hostile work environment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In sum, plaintiff alleged that defendant discriminated against her based on sex in numerous ways, including by excluding plaintiff from high-level and other meetings, and engaging in conduct that conveyed to plaintiff “that her position stood in jeopardy and contributed to the intimidation, anxiety, and sense of precarity she experienced in the workplace.”
From the decision:
Defendant urges dismissal of Count 3 for failure to allege facts that show the alleged harassment rose to the level of “severity” or “pervasiveness” necessary to show a hostile work environment. (DE 16 at 3-7). As Defendant correctly points out, courts apply a demanding standard to hostile work environment claims to prevent civil rights statutes from being converted into a “general civility code.” See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)” do not constitute a hostile work environment. Edgerton v. City of Plantation, No. 14-61472-CIV, 2016 WL 8943943, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2016), aff’d, 682 F. App’x 748 (11th Cir. 2017).
On review of the allegations here, the Court questions Plaintiff’s ultimate ability to prevail on Count 3. Indeed, courts have dismissed or granted summary judgment on hostile work environment claims that involved far more egregious workplace behavior. See, e.g., Godoy v. Habersham County, 211 F. App’x 850, 853-54 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment where supervisor subjected South-American plaintiff to racial slurs and told him “to go back to his boat and sail to South America where he belongs”); Barrow v. Ga. Pacific Corp., 144 F. App’x 54, 57 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming summary judgment where supervisors called plaintiff the “N word,” threatened to “kick [his] black ass,” and where other employees displayed a rebel flag, a KKK symbol, and a noose in front of him); Thompson v. City of Miami Beach, Fla., 990 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (dismissing claim where supervisor repeatedly referred to plaintiff using the “N word”).
Nevertheless, the Court finds the allegations of Count 3 minimally sufficient to survive dismissal. The Court reaches this conclusion, in part, because Defendant did not move to dismiss Count 1 [sex discrimination] and because the Court has denied the motion to dismiss Count 2 [retaliation]. As such, the undersigned recommends that the District Judge allow Count 3 to survive dismissal and proceed to discovery.
The court did noted, however, that defendant is free to revisit this claim at summary judgment, with the benefit of a full factual record. But for now, this claim will continue.