In Isasi v. Department of Education of the City of New York et al, No. 21-CV-03298 (NCM) (JAM), 2026 WL 2150180 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2026), the court, inter alia, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s sex-based hostile work environment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Plaintiff based on this claim on images circulated in a “group chat” which plaintiff found to be sexist:
For example, between January and March 2019, members of the group sent multiple memes that plaintiff found highly sexist. One member of the chat sent a doctored photo depicting President Joe Biden putting his hands on a woman’s chest over her blouse. Opp’n. Ex. 12 at 2, ECF No. 107-12.3 The photo’s caption referred to Biden as “Gropey” and to Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who was also pictured, as “Dopey.” Ex. 12 at 2. Raccuglia also sent a cartoon depicting Ocasio-Cortez mostly naked (and removing the rest of her clothes), Opp’n Ex. 13 at 2, ECF No. 107-13, and a meme of Ocasio-Cortez and a man in a sombrero captioned “Mexican Word of the Day: Bishop” with the caption “Can someone please shut this bishop?!”—apparently wordplay for “shut this bitch up,” Declaration of Shemori Corinthian (“Corinthian Decl.”) Ex. G at 12 (“Shut the Bishop” meme), ECF No. 106-9. Raccuglia also sent a cartoon depicting Ocasio-Cortez with large breasts and a crop top with the words “socialism is sexy” across the chest, Corinthian Decl. Ex. G at 13, and a photo of her captioned, “I went to a mind reader, she charged me half price,” Corinthian Decl. Ex. G at 19. Finally, Raccuglia also sent a meme that read “Blondes are now telling Alexandria Ocasio Cortez jokes.”
The court, applying the law, explained:
Plaintiff has also failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to her gender-based hostile environment claim. To support that claim, she points to the arguably sexist memes sent into the group chat and various statements made by Raccuglia—namely his habit of asking female coworkers to rate their own appearances and of commenting about his patriarchal relationship with his wife.10 Opp’n 14. Evaluating the totality of the circumstances, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue as to whether those images and statements, individually or collectively, created a workplace so “permeated with [sexist] intimidation, ridicule, and insult” that it was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [plaintiff’s] employment.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 320–21.
First, to address the memes: plaintiff emphasizes the images that “cit[ed] a phrase for ‘bitch’ … and highlight[ed] women’s breasts.” Opp’n 16. With respect to the use of “a phrase for ‘bitch,’ ” the Second Circuit has rejected any rule that would make the use of that word in the workplace a categorical indication of a hostile work environment. Pucino v. Verizon Wireless Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2010). And courts within this Circuit “have regularly concluded that the occasional use of that term is not severe enough to create a hostile work environment.” Drouillard v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 375 F. Supp. 3d 245, 265–66 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (collecting cases).
In Beale v. Mount Vernon Police Dep’t, for example, the court held that the plaintiff, a police officer, overhearing her supervisor refer to a female attorney as a “bitch” was insufficient to sustain a gender-based hostile work environment claim. 895 F. Supp. 2d 576, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). And, perhaps even more tellingly, other courts have held that it was insufficient when a coworker called the plaintiff a “bitch.” La Marco v. N.Y. State Nurses Ass’n, 118 F. Supp. 2d 310, 317-18 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (defendant’s use of the term “bitch,” in conjunction with other gender-neutral offensive conduct, was not enough to establish a sex-based hostile work environment). Thus, here, a single use of the term, directed at someone other than plaintiff, did not alter the conditions of plaintiff’s employment.The images “highlighting women’s breasts” also fall short. “[T]he display of pictures of naked people can, of course and depending on the context or circumstances, create a hostile working environment based on sex.” Sherman v. Fivesky, LLC, No. 19-cv-08015, 2020 WL 2136227, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2020) (collecting cases). “But the circumstances in which they do so are ones where they ‘create[ ] a working environment that [is] hostile to [the plaintiff] on the basis of [the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class],’ i.e., where the content of the material victimizes the recipient.” Id. (quoting Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 571 (2d Cir. 2000)). For example, courts have found gender-based hostile work environments based on the intra-workplace transmission of images that superimposed the plaintiff’s face on nude bodies. See, e.g., Gallagher v. AEG Mgmt. Brooklyn, LLC, No. 16-cv-04779, 2017 WL 2345658, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2017); Ruiz v. City of New York, No. 14-cv-05231 VEC, 2015 WL 5146629, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2015). Further, the sharing or displaying of pornographic images in the workplace has also supported an inference of a hostile work environment at the summary judgment stage. See Legg v. Ulster Cnty., 979 F.3d 101, 115 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding “the pervasive presence and use of pornographic magazines and screensavers (including by supervisory officers), sexual comments made by various officers about [a plaintiff’s] body, and the several specific incidents” involving a coworker staring at the plaintiff, breathing on her, and simulating sexual pleasure in front of her supported plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim).
However, the Second Circuit has held that not all nude or semi-nude images in the workplace give rise to a sex-based hostile work environment claim. In Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc., for example, it held that a prolonged display of photos of nude and partially clothed men in a shared office did not constitute a hostile work environment. 192 F.3d 310, 319 (2d Cir. 1999). In that case, the pictures and one instance of unwelcome sexual banter were the only evidence for plaintiff’s sex-based claim. Id. The Circuit explained that “while arguably offensive, the pictures and banter could not reasonably be characterized as physically threatening or humiliating” and thus could not sustain the plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. Id.
Here, as in Brennan and unlike in Gallager or Ruiz, none of the images depict or purport to depict plaintiff. Additionally, unlike in Legg, none of the images are pornographic or sexual. Closest to the line is the meme of President Biden groping a fully clothed woman’s chest, and, as with the Hitler meme discussed above, that is clearly a meme criticizing Biden for his perceived “[g]ropey”-ness—not celebrating or supporting it. Thus, even with these images grouped together, it is hard to see how they could be considered “physically threatening or humiliating” to plaintiff as a woman or how they could constitute “material [that] victimizes” her on the basis of her gender (as opposed to, say, her politics).11 That conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that Raccuglia sent the memes to a group chat that included multiple other women, including his supervisor, and that at least one of those women reacted positively to his messages. Isasi Decl. ¶ 19 (noting that Kiernan had responded positively to both the cartoon of a mostly naked Ocasio-Cortez and to the “Shut this Bishop” meme).
Nor do Raccuglia’s requests that his coworkers rate their own appearances or his comments about his wife move the needle. Though courts in this Circuit have pointed to instances of male workers rating or commenting on their female coworker’s appearances as part of broader findings of gender-based hostility, in such cases, the rating has been only one element of a broader hostile environment. See, e.g., Pascal v. Storage Tech. Corp., 152 F. Supp. 2d 191, 209 (D. Conn. 2001) (constant use of offensive and sexually explicit language by plaintiff’s coworker, sexually explicit discussions about other female employees in her presence, a photograph targeting her in a sexualized manner, and a plaque containing a sexual joke, all in the context of a predominantly male environment and following plaintiff’s complaints about such conduct amounted to a hostile environment).12 Here, in contrast, plaintiff points to no evidence that Raccuglia ever made sexually explicit comments; that he offered his own assessment of his coworkers’ appearances; or that other male coworkers joined in his commentary. Further, plaintiff never explains how Raccuglia’s statements and complaints about his own marriage could alter the terms of plaintiff’s employment. Thus, while Raccuglia’s comments were arguably inappropriate for the workplace, no reasonable jury could find that they created a hostile environment on the basis of gender.
Based on this, the court held that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact on her gender-based hostile environment claim.