In Florence v. 72AndSunny Sunny Partners, LLC, No. 25-CV-7082 (LJL), 2026 WL 2254417 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2026), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged gender discrimination asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.
As to Title VII, the court explained:
Plaintiff has properly alleged that she is a member of a protected class and that she is qualified for the position she was terminated from, having worked in the position for almost three years prior to her termination. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff’s termination constitutes an adverse action that affected negatively the terms and conditions of her employment. At this stage, the Court further assumes that the removal of all her direct reports, reassignment of key accounts, and exclusion from leadership meetings following her return from FMLA leave additionally constitute adverse actions under Muldrow. See Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 359 (adverse action alleged through, inter alia, transfer accompanied by more administrative tasks, less opportunity to work with higher ranked officers, and less prestige); Ashmeade v. Amazon.com, 2026 WL 880645, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026) (allegations of assignment to a higher workload with a greater proportion of menial tasks sufficient to allege harm); Anderson v. Amazon.com, 2024 WL 2801986, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2024) (“diminished role” with, inter alia, worse assignments, dampened prospects of promotion, and exclusion from meetings and projects sufficient to allege harm). Accordingly, the question is whether Plaintiff has properly pleaded sufficient facts to raise a plausible inference of intentional discrimination as to her race and gender, and whether she has properly pleaded that discrimination was a “but-for” cause of these actions.
Taken together, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to meet her minimal burden to raise a plausible inference of intentional discrimination as to her gender; her allegations are insufficient to raise a plausible inference of discrimination as to her race. Plaintiff first argues that she has adequately alleged an inference of intentional discrimination as to both of her protected characteristics because, as of the filing of her complaint, 72andSunny employs a white man in her former position. The fact that a plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class will ordinarily suffice for the required inference of discrimination at the initial prima facie stage of the Title VII analysis, including at the pleading stage.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 313; accord Sapio v. Selux Corp., 844 F. App’x 456, 457 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order); see Franchino v. Terence Cardinal Cook Health Care Ctr., Inc., 692 F. App’x 39, 43 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (inference of discrimination raised by allegation that male plaintiff was replaced by female employee may be undercut by allegations that other factors motivated termination). Similarly, a plaintiff has demonstrated an inference of discrimination and thus established a prima facie case where the majority of plaintiff’s responsibilities were transferred to an employee outside of her protected class.
Plaintiff’s allegation that a white man presently occupies her former position at 72andSunny, however, does not itself raise a plausible inference of discrimination as to either her race or her gender. Plaintiff’s employment was terminated in June 2023. She filed the AC in November 2025. Nearly two and a half years separated these two events. Plaintiff does not allege when within that two-year period the present occupant of her job was hired or whether there were persons other than the current occupant of the position who had Plaintiff’s job after her termination. That a white man now holds Plaintiff’s position—particularly if others took that position in the interim—does not necessarily say anything about whether Plaintiff’s employment was terminated because of her race or her gender. See David v. Comtech PST Corp., 2006 WL 2713936, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2006) (“That a younger employee hired three years after she was terminated has on rare occasion performed tasks similar to those she performed simply does not raise an inference of discrimination.”); cf. Peloquin v. Securitas Sec. Servs., USA, Inc., 2010 WL 2825720, at *2 (D. Conn. July 15, 2010) (in assessing whether plaintiff was “replaced” by younger employees, limiting analysis to first two subsequent employees who were under forty years old, rather than fifty-seven-year-old man who later occupied the position). For all that Plaintiff has alleged, it is possible that she was replaced in her job by a Black woman who then left for a different position at the company.
Plaintiff, however, alleges more. She also alleges that, shortly prior to her termination, all of her accounts and direct reports were transferred to less-qualified male employees. Particularly when considered with Plaintiff’s other allegations, this allegation is sufficient to establish a plausible inference that Plaintiff suffered discrimination on account of her gender.
(Citations omitted; cleaned up.)
Having found that plaintiff stated a gender discrimination claim under Title VII, the court likewise found that plaintiff’s claims survive under the “more liberal” New York State and City Human Rights Laws.