In Golat v. Skwierawski, No. 25-3164, 2026 WL 2240697 (7th Cir. Aug. 4, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, inter alia, affirmed the decision of a lower court granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff’s sex-based hostile work environment claim asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In sum, plaintiff, a court reporter, alleged that a judge for whom she worked made sexist comments to her.
After summarizing the black-letter law, the court applied it to the facts. This decision is instructive as to how courts apply Title VII’s “severe or pervasive” standard. From the decision:
To support a Title VII hostile work environment claim, Ms. Golat must show “(1) she was subjected to unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature; (2) the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment; (3) the conduct was directed at her because of her sex; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability.” Roby v. CWI, Inc., 579 F.3d 779, 784 (7th Cir. 2009). Ms. Golat admitted that Lee’s behavior was motivated by personal animosity. Similarly, there is no evidence whatsoever that the various disciplinary investigations into Ms. Golat were motivated by her sex. Judge Anderson’s alleged comments that Ms. Golat was faking her elbow injury also have no apparent connection to Ms. Golat’s sex. That being said, many of the comments made by Judge Anderson and in his presence by court staff and attorneys were clearly based on Ms. Golat’s sex. When comments are “sex-specific and derogatory” and are directed toward a female victim, a reasonable jury can conclude that they were made because of the plaintiff’s sex. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). Judge Anderson allegedly joked about Ms. Golat being a lesbian; told her that she behaved like a “junior high school girl”; told her that she “nag[s]” like a “typical woman”; asked her if she was going back to her office to cry; used a mug printed with images of male genitalia and the words “hung jury”; told Ms. Golat that he could sleep with any woman in the county; made jokes about a condom factory; and told Ms. Golat that he had a large penis. Additionally, in Judge Anderson’s presence, a court security officer joked about her physical appearance and an attorney told Ms. Golat that he found her attractive.
Ultimately, Ms. Golat’s claims fail because the alleged conduct is not objectively “severe or pervasive.” To be actionable under Title VII, conduct must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment such that it creates an abusive working environment.” Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 2009). Objective severity is not a “mathematically precise” standard, and it “depends on all of the circumstances.” Additionally, the analysis of severity frequently overlaps with and is influenced by the analysis of other elements, including the pervasiveness of the comments. In spite of this capacious description, “we must be careful not to substitute judicial pre-dilections for jury determinations.” We find it helpful, therefore, to review first the principles that can be distilled from cases discussing objective severity.
First, and most obviously, comments that are perceived as threats, expressions of sexual interest, sexual advances, or comments that are demeaning or embarrassing, are more likely to be severe.19 However, conduct does not need to be overtly sexual to be actionable. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903 F.3d at 626 (“[I]t need not consist of pressure for sex, intimate touching, or a barrage of deeply offensive sexual comments.”).
Second, comments that can be characterized as jokes or “vulgar banter” are less likely to be severe. Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 61, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)); Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 361 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that “teasing about waving at squad cars, ambiguous comments about bananas, rubber bands, and low-neck tops, staring and attempts to make eye contact, and four isolated incidents in which a co-worker briefly touched her arm, fingers, or buttocks” was not severe).
Third, the court should consider the target of the comments. Comments directed at someone other than the plaintiff, or at a group of people that simply includes the plaintiff, are less likely to be severe than comments made directly and exclusively to the plaintiff. Smith v. Northeastern Ill. Univ., 388 F.3d 559, 567 (7th Cir. 2004); Russell v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 243 F.3d 336, 343 (7th Cir. 2001); but cf. Yuknis v. First Student, Inc., 481 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the line between direct and second-hand harassment is “quite a fine one”).
Finally, in addition to examining the comments themselves, the court should consider the professional and personal relationship between the speaker and the plaintiff. Comments uttered by a supervisor are more likely to be severe than comments uttered by a co-worker. The severity is proportional to how directly the supervisor controls the plaintiff; a direct supervisor’s comments are more serious than an indirect supervisor’s comments.
The nature and quality of the personal relationship between the plaintiff and the speaker is also relevant; a former romantic relationship or a hostile relationship can “shed light on … whether the complained-of conduct was unwelcome, whether it resulted in a workplace that the harassee subjectively experienced as hostile, and whether it occurred because of the harassee’s sex.” Turner v. Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 686–87 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ammons-Lewis v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi., 488 F.3d 739, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2007)); see also Costco Wholesale Corp., 903 F.3d at 624–27 (holding that non-sexual comments and touching were severe because they took place in the context of the harasser stalking the plaintiff). However, a prior sexual relationship with the harasser is “by no means dispositive” because “ ‘[a] person’s private and consensual sexual activities do not constitute a waiver of his or her legal protections against unwelcome and unsolicited sexual harassment’ at work.” By considering these specific factors, courts can eliminate the temptation to decide based on a gut reaction to the comments, which is more likely to be infected by personal bias.
Although these incidents were unprofessional, rude, and offensive, it is undisputed that the conduct here was not threatening and that Ms. Golat did not construe them as sexual advances. Nor did she have a personal relationship with Judge Anderson that would suggest that they would be perceived as such. On the other hand, Judge Anderson held a position of power, not only as a judge, but also as the sole individual responsible for Ms. Golat’s hiring and firing. She served at his pleasure, which certainly increases the seriousness of his comments. See Vill. at Hamilton Pointe, 102 F.4th at 402.
However, some of the conduct (like the mug) was not directed exclusively at Ms. Golat, and the rest of the conduct cannot be characterized as more than the “occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers,” which is not enough.
(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added; cleaned up.)
The court proceeded to explain that the alleged conduct need not be both severe “and” pervasive, noting that “a relentless pattern of lesser harassment can be sufficient to meet the standard.” However, here, the court held that the alleged comments are “too sporadic” to support liability, noting, for example, that Judge Anderson made approximately six sexist or sexual comments directly to the plaintiff over a five-year period.