In Noriega et al v. Pure’s Food Specialties, LL and Jesus Salazar, No. 25 C 12621, 2026 WL 3181521 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2026), the court, inter alia, applied the “equal opportunity harasser” doctrine to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim of sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In sum, plaintiffs allege that defendant violated the law when he filmed the Plaintiffs, unknowingly, using the bathroom, and later, watched videos of the women he recorded to sexually gratify himself.
As to the issue of whether the harassment was “on the basis of sex”, the court explained:
Plaintiffs’ harassment claim fails for insufficiently pleading that the sexual harassment took place because of the Plaintiffs’ sex. Title VII prohibits harassment “because of” or “on the basis of” an individual’s sex. Pure’s Food relies on the “equal opportunity harasser” doctrine to support its contention that the Plaintiffs failed to establish Salazar sexually harassed them because of their sex. Under this doctrine, a defendant who harasses both genders has not violated Title VII; Title VII does not cover the “equal opportunity” or “bisexual” harasser, because such a person is not discriminating on the basis of sex. He is not treating one sex better (or worse) than the other; he is treating both sexes the same (albeit badly).
The Court previously dismissed the Plaintiffs’ sexual harassment claim under the equal opportunity harasser doctrine, and does so once more; the doctrine still applies to the Plaintiffs’ sexual harassment claims. The Plaintiffs believe the equal opportunity harasser doctrine does not protect Pure’s Food because (1) the Plaintiffs allege Salazar targeted woman and (2) the Court should reconsider Holman. The Court addresses the latter argument first, as it easily dismisses it. Holman remains binding precedent in this circuit, and thus, the Court must follow it.
Turning to the former argument, the Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege that Salazar targeted woman. First, the Plaintiffs reiterate that Salazar intended to record naked women and sexually gratified himself when watching the recorded footage of women, not men. The Court rejected this argument in its previous Order, holding that the Plaintiffs’ theory depends on speculation about Salazar’s subjective intentions and use of the recordings, rather than well-pleaded facts, so the Court did not have to accept them as true. The Court’s position has not changed. It rejects the Plaintiffs’ argument once more as mere speculation about Salazar’s intent and actions cannot form the basis of stating a plausible claim for relief.
The Plaintiffs allege additional facts in their Second Amended Complaint to support their sex-based harassment claim. The Plaintiffs claim Salazar targeted woman for the following reasons: he previously plead guilty to soliciting prostitution in a case involving a female, a female employee found a mini camera in the women’s locker room at Salazar’s previous place of employment, an unidentified woman reported Salazar for drugging her and engaging in non-consensual sex, and an officer had arrested and charged Salazar with allegedly sexually assaulting a minor female. Based on these facts, the Plaintiffs argue that Salazar treated women worse than men as he intended to film and watch the women caught on camera, not the men.
Even accepting these allegations as true, the Plaintiffs’ arguments miss the mark. Salazar’s harassing conduct took place when he filmed individuals in the restroom without their consent; the harassing conduct has nothing to do with Salazar’s sexual desires. Salazar harassed both sexes when he filmed men and women without their consent in the bathroom.
(Cleaned up.)
The court concluded that since plaintiffs failed to establish the harassment they experienced took place because of their sex, it would grant defendant’s motion to dismiss this count with prejudice.