In Stashak v. Phreesia, Inc., No. 25-CV-3808 (JMF), 2026 WL 249631 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim asserted under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
From the decision:
To bring a hostile work environment claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff “must show that ‘the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.’ ” Francis v. Elmsford Sch. Dist., 263 F. App’x 175, 177 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order) (quoting Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 469 F.3d 229, 240 (2d Cir. 2007)). “This standard has both objective and subjective components: the conduct complained of must be severe or pervasive enough that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive, and the victim must subjectively perceive the work environment to be abusive.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc., 192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The analysis of the hostile working environment theory of discrimination is the same under the ADEA as it is under Title VII.”). A hostile work environment claim can be based on “a single incident [that] was extraordinarily severe, or … a series of incidents [that] were sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of [the plaintiff’s] working environment.” Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Minor incidents do not merit relief.” Francis, 263 F. App’x at 177 (quoting Kassner, 469 F.3d at 240); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (observing that “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents” do not suffice (cleaned up)). “In determining whether a plaintiff meets the ‘severe or pervasive’ standard, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with a plaintiff’s job performance.” Harewood v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 18-CV-05487 (KPF) (KHP), 2019 WL 3042486, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2019) (quoting Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 745 (2d Cir. 2003)).
Measured against these standards, Stashak’s allegations are sufficient to support a claim. First, she alleges that her supervisor, Lynch, sought to push her out of Phreesia because of her age. See, e.g., FAC ¶ 84. In fact, Lynch allegedly told a coworker that she “was trying to push out [Stashak] because ‘she is getting too old, and we pay her too much “effing” money.’ ” Id. ¶ 34; see also Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he fact that a plaintiff learns second-hand of a [ ] derogatory comment … by a fellow employee or supervisor also can impact the work environment[.]”). The Complaint further alleges that Lynch gave Stashak negative performance reviews, excluded her from quarterly meetings (and lied to her about doing so), and participated in limiting Stashak’s compensation, all because of her age. See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 59, 69-72. Second, Stashak alleges that ageist conduct was pervasive in the workplace. Younger employees, the Complaint alleges, “constantly made negative, harassing, and offensive jokes or remarks about older people in the working world.” Id. ¶ 32; see also id. ¶ 78-79 (alleging that one of Lynch’s direct reports “vehemently complain[ed] about ‘50 something year old middle aged women’ ” on a conference call). And employees under forty years old excluded Stashak from a company group chat called the “wolfpack,” in which they “routinely complain[ed] about older generations and about” Stashak specifically. Id. ¶¶ 30-32. And finally, Stashak also alleges that her supervisors took adverse actions against her on the basis of age, thereby contributing to a hostile environment. See, e.g., King v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 23-CV-7622 (ER), 2025 WL 2083831, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2025) (considering “whether the employee suffered an adverse employment action” in assessing a hostile work environment claim); accord Zoulas v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 400 F. Supp. 3d 25, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). For instance, Stashak alleges that she was formally removed from client accounts, leading to “a significant loss of prestige that was incredibly distressing and embarrassing.” Id. ¶ 60. And from 2018 (when all other older employees were terminated) to 2024, Phreesia decreased Stashak’s commissions from 6% to 1.75%. Id. ¶¶ 35, 40. “No younger employees were forced to accept lower commissions, and all older employees had already been terminated.” Id. ¶ 36.
To be sure, some of Stashak’s allegations (for example, that employees “constantly” made negative comments about older people and that such belittling was “common”) border on conclusory. FAC ¶¶ 30-32, 78-79, 81. But taken together and construed in the light most favorable to Stashak, her allegations state a plausible claim. Indeed, the allegations are as strong as, if not stronger than, allegations that other courts have found sufficient at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See, e.g., Rosen v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 18-CV-6670 (AT), 2019 WL 4039958, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2019) (sustaining a claim where the plaintiff was highly experienced but her duties were transferred to younger employees and other older teachers experienced similar discrimination); Zoulas, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 60 (finding comments that age affected plaintiff’s work performance coupled with other discriminatory behavior like changing her classroom but not the classroom of younger employees, denying her professional development opportunities, and having other teachers harass her, sufficient to plausibly allege a hostile work environment); Verne v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 21-CV-5427 (JPC), 2022 WL 4626533, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022) (same when the plaintiff “was negatively reviewed on the basis of her age, repeatedly improperly disciplined on the basis of her age, and subject to age-based insults”); see also, e.g., Terry, 336 F.3d at 148 (“While the standard for establishing a hostile work environment is high, we have repeatedly cautioned against setting the bar too high[.]”).
Based on this, the court concluded that plaintiff’s allegations go beyond “episodic instances of mere offensive utterances” and support an inference that Phreesia “alter[ed] the conditions of [her] work environment” because of her age, warranting the denial of defendant’s motion.