In Schaffer v. GeneDx, LLC et al, No. 25 CIV. 2550 (DEH) (GS), 2026 WL 265338 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2026), the court, inter alia, recommended that defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s sex-based hostile work environment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 be granted.
From the decision:
Even accepting Schaffer’s allegations as true, there is nothing in the Amended Complaint plausibly suggesting that Schaffer’s workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” so “severe or pervasive” as to have altered the conditions of his employment or created an abusive working environment. Molina, 2024 WL 4276913, at *8. To be sure, the complaint is rife with allegations that, due to her supposed insecurities and erratic management style, Stueland created a “toxic” and “hostile” work environment for Schaffer (and other management team members) at GeneDx. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 61, 73, 79, 85, 87–88, 99, 206). But “a hostile work environment ‘is actionable [under Title VII] only when it occurs because of an employee’s … protected characteristic.’ ” Bliss v. MXK Rest. Corp., 220 F. Supp. 3d 419, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)) (emphasis added by Bliss court); see also Paupaw-Myrie v. Mt. Vernon City School Dist., 653 F. Supp. 3d 80, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (while workplaces with “abusive bosses, … nastiness, or unfairness” may be “hostile in the colloquial sense, they do not violate the law unless they are that way because of an employee’s protected characteristic’ ” (quoting Estevez v. Berkeley Coll., No. 18 Civ. 10350 (CS), 2021 WL 3115452, at *19 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2021))). Because the complaint does not plead facts plausibly suggesting that the alleged “toxic” or “hostile” environment at GeneDx was due to his race or sex, Schaffer’s hostile work environment allegations fail to state a claim under Title VII, § 1981, or the CFEPA.
Schaffer does allege that Stueland made comments suggesting a preference for female employees. (Compl. ¶¶ 30, 77). But as noted above, Schaffer does not allege that these comments were directed at him or had any impact on him. Nor does he appear to rely on them in support of his hostile work environment claims. Even if he did so rely on them, however, Stueland’s comments were not so severe or pervasive as to state a claim under Title VII. See, e.g., Kugel v. Queens Nassau Nursing Home Inc., 568 F. Supp. 3d 253, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (dismissing hostile work environment claim where plaintiff did not allege that she was “subjected to daily, constant, or continuous patterns of hostile behavior”); Alvarado v. Mount Pleasant Cottage Sch. Dist., 404 F. Supp. 3d 763, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (dismissing claim based on “isolated and sporadic incidents that occurred over the course of a year”); Lenart v. Coach Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 61, 68–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (dismissing claim that employer made comments on “numerous occasions” that she would “like to have a staff of all women” as insufficiently pervasive). Moreover, Schaffer “fail[s] to allege that these remarks unreasonably interfered with h[is] job performance.” Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 713 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–23 (1993)).
Schaffer also alleges that Stueland unfairly had Fenwick monitor his work product and blamed him for problems that were not his fault. (Compl. ¶¶ 53–55, 73, 109). These allegations fare no better, however, as even intense scrutiny and hawkish micro-management is insufficiently severe or pervasive to state a claim for hostile work environment under Title VII. See, e.g., Doran v. New York State Dep’t of Health Off. of Medicaid Inspector Gen., No. 15 Civ. 7217 (PKC) (SN), 2017 WL 836027, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2017) (dismissing claim as “a supervisor’s close scrutiny and unreasonable criticism, without more, fails to rise to the level of discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive” to adequately allege a hostile work environment claim); Paupaw-Myrie, 653 F. Supp. 3d at 105 (dismissing claims that, inter alia, supervisor ridiculed plaintiff, subjected her to harsher scrutiny, refused to provide support, called her at late hours, and was extremely aggressive as “not plausibly objectively severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment”). Rather, outside counsel’s monitoring of work-related tasks at Stueland’s direction constitutes the ordinary kind of workplace behavior that, even if frustrating to Schaffer, does not rise to the level of a hostile work environment.
Based on this, the court held that dismissal of plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims was warranted.
However, the court found that plaintiff sufficiently alleged an inference of race- and sex-based discrimination, and thus permitted his disparate treatment claims to proceed.