In Fisher v. Valley Stream Central High School District et al, 2025 WL 2467046 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2025), the court, inter alia, held that plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of action for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendants suspended her pay and benefits, in retaliation for her complaints to management, union representatives, and union president.
After summarizing the black-letter law governing retaliation claim, the court applied it to the facts as follows:
First, the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that Fisher engaged in multiple protected activities: (1) she had meetings with the VSCHSD administration “every year since 2014,” in which she “expressed her concerns about … the unfair and excessive amount of work she was expected to do simply because she was an unmarried woman with children” and “the constant bullying and harassment she faced from her coworkers” (id. ¶ 37); (2) she met with representatives of Local 1633 in September 2020, March 2021, and April 2021 to discuss her concerns (Ii. ¶ 51); and (3) she had a phone call with the Local 1633 president on April 26, 2021 regarding these same issues (id. ¶ 53.) Defendants’ argument that Fisher did not engage in any protected activity because her underlying claim of sex plus discrimination is non-meritorious misstates the law, which only requires that the complainant had a “good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying challenged actions of the employer violated [Title VII].” Gregory, 243 F.3d at 701. Here, the Amended Complaint sufficiently pleads that Fisher had a good-faith basis to believe that the conduct about which she complained violated Title VII. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 37 (alleging that Fisher raised her concerns that she faced discrimination based on her sex and status as an unmarried woman without children in meetings with the VSCHSD administration in the first instance); id. ¶ 51 (alleging that Fisher subsequently met with Local 1633 representatives regarding her concerns).)
Second, the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that Defendants were aware of at least some of the alleged protected activities. In particular, the Amended Complaint specifically alleges that she met with the VSCHSD administration “every year” since 2014 to discuss her belief that the treatment she faced was “simply because she was an unmarried woman without children.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 37.) Thus, “Defendants were put on direct notice of discrimination she faced at least six (6) times over the years since 2014.” (Id. ¶ 39.) The Amended Complaint does not expressly allege that Defendants were aware of Fisher’s communications with Local 1633 representatives and the president. It does, however, allege that the Local 1633 president informed Fisher that she was “on a slippery slope with the District,” which suggests that the union and Defendants had some degree of communication regarding Fisher’s actions. (Id. ¶ 52.)
Third, the only timely alleged retaliatory incident, the suspension of Fisher’s pay and benefits, satisfies the adverse action requirement, as the loss of one’s income and benefits plainly may “dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” See Carr, 76 F.4th at 179.
Fourth, the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges a causal relationship between the alleged protected activities and Defendants’ decision to suspend Fisher’s pay and benefits. In particular, the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges facts showing retaliatory intent—for example, the Local 1633 president’s decision to discourage Fisher from lodging further complaints because she was on “a slippery slope with the District.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 52.) Moreover, the temporal proximity between the April 26, 2021 call with the Local 1633 president and the September 1, 2021 suspension of Fisher’s pay and benefits plausibly alleges a causal connection at the pleading stage. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48, 52; See Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Though this Court has not drawn a bright line defining, for the purposes of a prima facie case, the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish causation, we have previously held that five months is not too long to find the causal relationship.”).
Defendants’ arguments for dismissal of Fisher’s retaliation claim center on the Amended Complaint’s allegation that Defendants suspended Fisher’s pay and benefits in “retaliation for her FMLA leave taken in February 2021,” and I address that separate claim below, Discussion Section VIII.b. (Mem. at 16.) But the Amended Complaint also alleges that Defendants suspended Fisher’s pay and benefits “as a means of retaliating against her for complaining about their years-long campaign of discrimination and unlawful, hostile treatment.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 50.) Defendants cite no authority suggesting that Fisher cannot bring retaliation claims under both Title VII and the FMLA, or that, at the pleading stage, Fisher’s Title VII retaliation claim cannot go forward even if the FLMA retaliation claim does not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Accordingly, dismissal was not warranted.