In Scheppelman v. County of Berrien, No. 1:24-CV-1104, 2025 WL 3119191 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2025), the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, due to the absence of vicarious liability.
Initially, the court held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged a hostile work environment:
Scheppelman argues that she was constructively discharged by the existence of a hostile work environment at the BCJ. A hostile work environment claim requires that a plaintiff was harassed due to their age, “either through words or actions,” and that the harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.”Brown v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 722 F. App’x 520, 525 (6th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original). Additionally, “[a] hostile-environment constructive discharge claim” requires “working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004)). In determining whether a hostile work environment exists, courts should consider “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., 643 F.3d 502, 512 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
Scheppelman argues that she was subject to both verbal harassment and harassing conduct based on age. Specifically, she points to (1) Culbertson making comments like “Aren’t you too old to be working here?”; “When are you going to retire?”; and “Why do we always get the old nurses?”; (2) Bowman “dismiss[ing] Ms. Scheppelman’s capabilities by saying she was ‘too old’ ” and “frequently…referring to her as ‘slow.’ ”; (3) BCJ officers preventing her from administering medication by refusing to unlock units within a reasonable time and interrupting her with pretend emergencies; (4) BCJ officers taunting her over the intercom, such as by calling her “slow,” as she was completing her work. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21–23, 26, 28.)
The County argues that Scheppelman has not alleged facts supporting the inference that the BCJ officers’ conduct was based on her age. Some of the comments described above are self-evidently due to Scheppelman’s age. But the officers’ insults do not alone support a hostile work environment claim, as statements that are “insensitive, ignorant, and bigoted” do not produce a hostile work environment if they “more closely resemble a ‘mere offensive utterance’ than conduct that is ‘physically threatening or humiliating.’ ” Williams, 643 F.3d at 513 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). Rather, Scheppelman has only alleged a hostile work environment if the officers’ other conduct is considered as well, and that conduct is properly considered in the analysis only if she has sufficiently alleged that it was based on a discriminatory motive.
Although the officers’ interference with Scheppelman’s work was not explicitly based on age, it can still support a hostile work environment claim if one can reasonably infer that the officers only treated her poorly due to her age. See Clay v. UPS, Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 706 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Conduct that is not explicitly race-based may be illegally race-based and properly considered in a hostile-work-environment analysis when it can be shown that but for the employee’s race, she would not have been the object of harassment.”). In determining whether the officers’ treatment of Scheppelman was based on her age, the Court considers the officers’ conduct in light of “all of the circumstances.” Farmer v. Cleveland Pub. Power, 295 F.3d 593, 605 (6th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by White v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 429 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 2005).
Considering all of the circumstances, the complaint sufficiently alleges that the officers’ conduct was based on Scheppelman’s age. The pervasive nature of the age-based comments suggests that the officers generally looked down on Scheppelman due to her age; this, in turn, supports the inference that their negative treatment of her was age-based. Cf. Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 662 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A] showing of the use of racial epithets in a work environment may create an inference that racial animus motivated other conduct as well.”); Betts v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 558 F.3d 461, 469–70 (6th Cir. 2009) (hostile work environment can be supported by evidence that supervisor had “systematic racial bias” and a racist “managerial philosophy”). Furthermore, the officers’ alleged interference with Scheppelman’s work is so unreasonable—and so contrary to their own duties as employees, let alone the medical needs of inmates—that discriminatory intent becomes a plausible explanation. Cf. Keck v. Graham Hotel Sys., Inc., 566 F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2009) (in the commercial establishment context, plaintiff can establish inference of discriminatory intent by showing that defendant’s conduct was against own interests, violative of business norms, and “arbitrary on its face”). Additionally, Scheppelman alleges that much of the obstructive conduct took place while the officers made derogatory comments over the intercom, which directly ties their discriminatory motives to their conduct. It is true that the example of a derogatory comment provided in the complaint—calling Scheppelman “slow”—is not inherently an age-based remark. But Scheppelman’s allegation that Bowman called her “too old” and “slow” suggests that the word “slow” was understood by the officers to be an age-based insult. Putting all this together, it is reasonable to interpret the officers’ conduct as motivated by discriminatory intent.
Given the inference that the officers’ conduct was discriminatory, Scheppelman has sufficiently alleged that she was subject to an age-based hostile work environment. The officers’ obstructive conduct was frequent and pervasive, and “unreasonably interfere[d] with [her] work performance.” Williams, 643 F.3d at 512. Indeed, the officers’ behavior during her medication rounds made it essentially impossible for her to complete her work. Furthermore, when faced with such constant interference—especially given the importance of a nurse’s medical duties—“a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.” Brown, 722 F. App’x at 525.
The court concluded that these elements, taken together, indicate that the BCJ officers created a hostile work environment.
However, the court held that the plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the defendant was on notice of the officers’ harassment.