In Holloway v. Fort Bend Independent School District, No. 4:24-CV-2014, 2025 WL 3158133 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2025), the court, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for discrimination, based on her reassignment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
To state a claim for discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must plead that she “(1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside [her] protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group.” Offord v. City of Fulshear, 861 F. App’x 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007)).
Here, FBISD argues that Holloway’s allegations fail to state a cognizable claim for discrimination under Title VII. (Dkt. No. 33 at ¶ 25). FBISD argues, “Plaintiff seeks to rely upon facts that this Court cannot entertain as such facts have not been timely raised nor properly exhausted.” (Dkt. No. 43 at ¶ 6). As discussed above, the discrimination claim arising from Holloway’s remote work request was not timely filed with the EEOC. That claim is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1), so the court will not analyze it here. However, Holloway’s claim for discrimination based on her reassignment was timely, and the court will now consider if Holloway has pled sufficient facts to make a plausible claim for discrimination based on that event.
FBISD maintains that Holloway’s complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show the third and fourth elements of a Title VII discrimination claim. (Dkt. No. 33 at ¶ 38). In her complaint, Holloway alleges that FBISD “took a further adverse employment action against Plaintiff by demoting her to a nonsupervisory position and assigning her to work in a hallway.” (Dkt. No. 28 at ¶ 44). FBISD argues that Holloway’s reassignment “was not an adverse employment action as the reassignment was a remedy granted by the grievance hearing officer pursuant to Plaintiff’s grievance.” (
A plaintiff suffers an adverse employment action when there is “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir.1998). The Fifth Circuit has determined that a transfer can qualify as an adverse employment action when it is the “equivalent of a demotion.” Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 2007). And “[t]o be equivalent to a demotion, a transfer need not result in a decrease in pay, title, or grade; it can be a demotion if the new position proves objectively worse—such as being less prestigious or less interesting or providing less room for advancement.” Id. at 613. Holloway’s allegation that FBISD reassigned her to a non-supervisory position indicates that her new job had significantly different responsibilities from and was a demotion from her former role. Therefore, taking Holloway’s allegations as true, the court concludes that she has stated facts sufficient to show that she suffered an adverse employment action.
FBISD also argues that because Holloway’s reassignment was not an adverse employment action, the individual who replaced Holloway in her “previous position is not relevant.” (Dkt. No. 33 at ¶ 36). FBISD makes no further argument about Holloway’s failure to sufficiently allege the fourth element. Because Holloway alleges that she was replaced with a white female, the court finds that Holloway has also sufficiently pleaded the fourth element of her Title VII discrimination claim.
Accordingly, held the court, dismissal was not warranted.