In Eskinazi v. Corporate Subscription Management Services, LLC, No. 2:25-CV-04879 (BRM) (JRA), 2026 WL 445809 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2026), the court, inter alia, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim(s).
From the decision:
To succeed on a hostile work environment claim, a “plaintiff must establish that 1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of his/her sex, 2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive, 3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, 4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances, and 5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.” Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Hamzat v. Pritzker, Civ. A. No. 14-6440, 2017 WL 2798247, at *3 (D.N.J. June 28, 2017) (applying same framework to a Title VII disability based hostile work environment claim); Retzler v. McDonalds, Civ. A. No. 20-1256, 2020 WL 1164797, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2020) (articulating same framework for a Title VII age based hostile work environment claim). “The first four elements establish a hostile work environment, and the fifth element determines employer liability.” Id. (citing Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir.2009)). The hostile work environment standard is an objective one, based on “an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). “However, even where ‘many of [a] plaintiff[’s] allegations, standing alone, would be insufficient to state a cause of action,’ the allegations may be [enough] to state a claim when ‘[v]iewed cumulatively.’ ”
Eskinazi has alleged facts to support her hostile work environment claim at this point in the litigation. Here, Defendants’ primary argument against Eskinazi’s hostile work environment claim is the Amended Complaint “does not contain any allegations that she was subjected to any discriminatory intimidation, let alone anything that would rise to the level of being pervasive or severe.” (ECF No. 36-1 at 13.) Eskinazi, on the other hand, highlights the facts in her Amended Complaint she claims would support pervasive and severe conduct that would support such a claim. (ECF No. 40 at 15–17 (citing ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 17–19, 21–22, 25–26).) According to Defendants, these allegations are, “at most, discrete employment decisions or workplace disagreements, not a pattern of discriminatory intimidation or abuse.” (ECF No. 13.)
Here, “because Defendant[s’] challenge to [Eskinazi’s] hostile work environment claim is centered around the severe and pervasive element, the Court joins other district courts in [the Third] Circuit who have determined that this issue is best reserved for summary judgment.” Hopkins, 2025 WL 2350469, at *6 (collecting cases). Construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Eskinazi, Eskinazi has set forth sufficient facts to plead a plausible hostile work environment claim based on her sex, age, and perceived disability. Hopkins, 2025 WL 2350469, at *6 (concluding the plaintiff had made out a hostile work environment claim by alleging, in part, he was passed over in favor of younger employers and was denied training or access to programs necessary to do his job “dating back to 2020”). As in Hopkins, Eskinazi has alleged severe and pervasive conduct dating back to 2020. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 18.) For example, she alleges she trained younger, non-disabled and several male staff in June 2020 who ended up with more senior titles and more pay. (Id.) Additionally, in “July 2021 to July 2022,” despite coming up with solutions to problems at work, she claims male coworkers were receiving the credit. (Id. ¶ 19.)
Based on this, the court held that denial of the motion to dismiss was warranted.