In Mikhail v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, No. 24-CV-08367 (MMG), 2026 WL 880297 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026), the court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s national origin discrimination and retaliation claims asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Plaintiff alleges that, of ten managers at his level in his department, he is the only one of Russian national origin. Dkt. No. 9 ¶ 21. He also alleges that—although his comparably-situated co-workers engaged in the same activities of swearing at work, working remotely more than twice per week, or permitting others to work remotely—he alone was targeted for disciplinary action. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25–26, 31, 47, 55–59. He also alleges that a supervisor stated, “Russians are ‘too direct’ and that [Plaintiff] needed to work on his tone for that reason.” Id. ¶ 60. A Russian supervisor also advised Plaintiff “that they both had to work extra hard to manage their tone because they are Russian.” Id. ¶ 61. These comments coupled with Plaintiff’s allegations of disparate enforcement of work policies suffice to state a claim for discrimination based on national origin, at least at this stage of the case. Plaintiff has also stated a claim for discrimination based on age given his allegations that he was paid less than older peers in the same pay grade who were otherwise comparable to him, and his allegation that his supervisors “expressed their dissatisfaction with [Plaintiff’s] salary relative to his age, asserting that [Plaintiff] made too much for how young he was.” Id. ¶¶ 72–73. Finally, Plaintiff has stated a claim for retaliation because he engaged in protected activity by complaining of discrimination to his supervisors and filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the MTA shortly thereafter terminated his employment. Id. ¶¶ 77–84.
None of Defendant’s counter arguments withstand scrutiny. See Dkt. No. 19. Plaintiff adequately alleges he was treated worse than similarly-situated colleagues who engaged in the same behavior as Plaintiff but evaded disciplinary repercussions. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25–26, 31, 47, 55–59; see Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[A]t the pleadings stage of an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff has a minimal burden of alleging facts suggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation.”)1 Plaintiff also does not need to allege a specific comparator so long as he can show (as he does) that individuals outside his protected group did not face the same alleged discriminatory conduct. See Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 110 (2d Cir. 2019); see id. at 111 (reversing a grant of summary judgment where—although the plaintiff could not identify a comparator—she established that men in different positions received above-market rate compensation while women received below-market rate compensation).
Plaintiff has also adequately shown a causal connection between his complaints and termination given the temporal proximity between his escalating complaints to management beginning in December 2023, see Dkt. No. 9 ¶¶ 77–832; his EEOC complaint in March 2024, id. ¶ 84; and his termination in April 2024, id.; see also Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002) (commenting with regard to a Title VII retaliation claim that “[a] plaintiff’s burden at [the] prima facie stage is de minimis”); Ulrich v. Soft Drinks, Brewery Workers & Delivery Emps., 425 F. Supp. 3d 234, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (determining at the pleading stage an employee could show a causal connection between a complaint and his termination where he was terminated two months after engaging in protected activity).
Accordingly, dismissal was not warranted. Plaintiff’s claims will proceed.