In Almonte v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority Long Island Railroad, No. 24-CV-00113 (ENV) (JRC), 2026 WL 3231604 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2026), the court, inter alia, discussed and applied the “administrative exhaustion” requirement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
From the decision:
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “ ‘to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’ ” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354, 144 S. Ct. 967, 974, 218 L. Ed. 2d 322 (2024). As for the relevant adverse employment action, a party must show only “some harm respecting an identifying term of condition of employment.” Id. at 355.
“[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies” before EEOC is a “precondition” to bringing a Title VII action in federal court.4 Francis v. City of New York, 235 F.3d 763, 768 (2d Cir. 2000). To raise administrative exhaustion in a motion to dismiss, see, e.g., Hardway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dep’t, 879 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2018), the non-exhaustion must be “clear from the face of the complaint (and incorporated documents),” Caddick v. Pers. Co. I LLC, No. 16-cv-7326, 2018 WL 3222520, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2018). EEOC’s right-to-sue letter generally must be filed with a complaint seeking Title VII relief in federal court. DiPetto v. U.S. Postal Serv., 383 Fed. App’x 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order). After addressing exhaustion in only broad strokes in the complaint, see Compl. ¶¶ 7, 9, 11, plaintiff attached, for the first time, the EEOC right-to-sue letter as Exhibit 1 to his opposition brief, see Dkt. No. 23-1.5
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court were to accept this belated submission, the claim brought in district court still must have been either (1) expressly raised before EEOC or (2) “reasonably related” to the respective EEOC charge. Caddick, 2018 WL 3222520, at *6. There are three “limited avenues” to the latter category: (1) those that “fall within the scope of the EEOC investigation” that “can reasonably be expected to grow out of” the discrimination charge; (2) those that “allege retaliation arising from the filing of an EEOC charge”; and (3) those that “allege further incidents of discrimination carried out in precisely the same manner alleged in the EEOC charge.” Id. “The focus” of this inquiry “should be on the factual allegations … in the [EEOC] charge … describing the discriminatory conduct.”
Applying these principles, the court concluded that plaintiff’s Title VII race-based discrimination claim did not fit in these categories, noting that while plaintiff checked the “Race/Color or Ethnicity” box on the EEOC charge forms, the substance of those charges supported only potential age-based discrimination, which is not covered by Title VII.